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The Palestinian Refugees' "Right to Return" 
and the Peace Processt 
justus R. Weiner* 
INTRODUCTION 
Both Palestinians and Israelis are ideologically committed to the 
return of their brethren from the diaspora. While Israel has substan-
tially fulfilled this goal with the "aliyah" (immigration) of more than 
two million Jews since 1948, a similar Palestinian yearning has yet to 
be realized. 
For Palestinians, the claimed "right to return" is the cornerstone of 
their struggle against Israel. 1 It is bound up in their yearning for 
international recognition of a separate Palestinian national identity 
which they assert is based, in part, on their residence in British Man-
datory Palestine prior to the establishment of the State of Israel. If this 
national identity is accepted by Israel, self-determination in the form 
of statehood and its recognition by the entire international community 
would be virtually guaranteed. By contrast, the return of Palestinians 
t Copyright 1996 Justus R. Weiner 
*Adjunct lecturer at Hebrew University and Tel Aviv University. B.A., Colgate University (1972); 
J.D., University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law (1975). The author is currently 
a Scholar in Residence at the Jerusalem Center for Public Mfairs. He is an international human 
rights lawyer and a member of the Israel and New York Bar Associations. The support of the 
Jerusalem Center for Public Mfairs, and particularly its President, Professor Daniel]. Elazar, was 
essential in writing this article. The author expresses his indebtedness to Daniel Ohana and Tal 
Becker for their creative legal input and sustained commitment to this project. In addition, the 
author is grateful to Paul Lambert,JeffMunjack and Max Rapaport for their research and editing 
work on this article. 
1 Marie Syrkin, The Palestinian Refugees: Resettlement, Repatriation, or Restoration, in IsRAEL, THE 
ARABS AND THE MIDDLE EAST 157, 157 (Irving Howe & Carl Gershman eds., 1972). The Pales-
tinians are unique among groups of refugees in that they have aspired to repatriation while the 
political conditions that caused them to be refugees persist. Generally refugees have sought 
asylum rather than repatriation. Kurt Rene Radley, The Palestinian Refugees: The Right to Return 
in International Law, 72 AM.J. lNT'L L. 586, 611 (1978). Hence their aspirations find little support 
in the international law on refugees, principally the Convention on the Status of Refugees. See 
id. at 609-11; see also Convention on the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137. 
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poses direct ideological and existential threats to Israel. Zionism, the 
modern movement for the return of Jews to their ancient homeland, 
views a Palestinian "right to return" as antithetical to the special, even 
God-given, historical and religious relationship Jews have with the land. 
These concerns have been exacerbated by the rhetoric of Palestinian 
leaders who have traditionally advocated the return of their diaspora 
as a means or step toward the liquidation oflsrael and its replacement 
by a Palestinian state.2 Moreover, the demographic balance between 
Jews and Arabs would be influenced by an influx of large numbers of 
Palestinians whose role could be that of a Trojan horse. 3 
In view of the fundamental nature of this conflict, a successful 
settlement of the Palestinian refugee and displaced persons issue is 
imperative to the success of the final status Israeli-Palestinian peace 
talks. These negotiations began on May 5, 1996 and are scheduled to 
be concluded within three years. This article seeks to analyze the legal 
and historical bases of the opposing Palestinian and Israeli viewpoints 
on the return issue that are likely to emerge during the final status 
peace talks and to suggest options for overcoming this controversy. 
This article is divided into three major sections. The first reviews 
recent efforts to solve the Palestinian refugee and displaced persons 
problems in the context of the interim peace agreements, and details 
the differing perspectives on the origin and nature of the conflict. This 
section also assesses the political significance of these issues to Pales-
tinians, Israelis and others. Section II applies principles of interna-
tional law to the Palestinian return question. The author's suggestion, 
namely, that an international arbitral forum be devised to resolve 
Palestinian and Jewish financial claims, is submitted in Section III. The 
2 According to a statement by Vasser Arafat to a closed meeting of Arab ambassadors in 
Stockholm on January 30, 1996: 
Within five years we will have six to seven million Arabs living on the West Bank and 
Jerusalem. All Palestinian Arabs will be welcomed by us. If the Jews can import all kinds 
of Ethiopians, Russians, Uzbekians, and Ukranians as Jews, we can import all kinds of 
Arabs. We plan to eliminate the State of Israel and establish a Palestinian state. We will 
make life unbearable for Jews by psychological warfare and population explosion. Jews 
will not want to live among Arabs. 
Andreas Vistnes, Arafat Talte om a Tilintetgjare Israel [Arafat Spoke About Eliminating Israel], 
DAGEN, Feb. 16, 1996, at 1, 2. The report was denied by Arafat's office in Gaza, but was confirmed 
by Israel Television's Arab Affairs correspondent Ehud Ya'ari. Regardless of its accuracy, both its 
content and strident rhetoric increased Israeli apprehensions about the direction of the peace 
process. Justus R. Weiner, The Peace Process And the "Right of Return," SuRv. OF ARAB AFF., May 
15, 1996, at 5. 
3 See Teddy Preuss, Refugees: The Real Issue, jERUSALEM PosT, Oct. 20, 1993, at 6. 
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article concludes with a discussion of the centrality of the Palestinian 
return issue to final status peace negotiations. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Recent Efforts to Resolve the Palestinian Refugee Problem 
1. The Palestinian Goal of "Return" in the Interim Peace 
Agreements 
At the outset it is useful to review the legal framework in which the 
return issue is being negotiated. Since the commencement of the 
current Israeli-Palestinian peace process five agreements have been 
reached. The first was the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements (D.O.P.) .4 It established the overall frame-
work for negotiations in view of reaching interim agreements and, 
thereafter, a final status agreement. Second, the Israel-Palestine Lib-
eration Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho 
Area (Cairo Agreement) 5 provided for the partial withdrawal of Israeli 
administration and military forces in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area 
and the assumption of most local control by the Palestinian Authority 
(PA). The third, the Agreement on Preparatory Powers and Responsi-
bilities (Erez Agreement) ,6 allows the transfer of authority to the PAin 
certain limited spheres such as health, social welfare, direct taxation, 
tourism, education and culture in the parts of the West Bank outside 
of the Jericho area. The fourth agreement, The Protocol on Further 
Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (Further Transfer Protocol) ,7 
provides for the transfer of powers in the West Bank to the PA in the 
following civil spheres: labor, industry and commerce, gas, petroleum, 
agriculture, local government, statistics and postal services. 
The late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PA Chairman 
Yasser Arafat signed the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip8 (Oslo II) in Washington, on September 28, 
4 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-
P.L.O., 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter D.O.P.]. 
5 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-P.L.O., 33 I.L.M. 622 
(1994) (signed in Cairo) [hereinafter Cairo Agreement]. 
6 Agreement on Preparatory Powers and Responsibilities, Aug. 29, 1994, Isr.-P.L.O., 34 I.L.M. 
455 (signed at the Erez checkpoint between Israel and the Gaza Strip). 
7 Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, Aug. 27, 1995, Isr.-P.L.O. (on 
file with author). 
8 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Isr.-P.L.O., Sept. 28, 1995 (signed in 
Washington, D.C.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Oslo II]. 
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1995. Oslo II was formulated as the final interim agreement between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians and, as such, supersedes all previous 
agreements concluded between the parties except the D.O.P.9 The 
Oslo II agreement gave PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and his appointed 
administration limited territorial, functional and personal jurisdiction 
over most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, pursuant to Oslo 
II, the PA has assumed powers in a vast array of fields touching upon 
the daily life of all Palestinian residents in these areas. This agreement 
set forth the framework for the election of the Palestinian Interim 
Self-Government Authority (Council) and the Ra 'ees (Chairman) of its 
Executive Authority. These elections were carried out on January 20, 
1996. Council candidates affiliated with the Fatah PLO faction 10 won 
most of the seats and Yassir Arafat was overwhelmingly elected as the 
Chairman 11 of what is still generally referred to as the PA. 
The five above-mentioned agreements, together with their annexes, 
accompanying letters and maps encompass hundreds of detailed 
pages. Yet only cursory and ambiguous references to the issues covered 
in this article appear therein. Due to the delicate nature of the Pales-
tinian-Israeli negotiations, the primary strategy taken since the D.O.P. 12 
has been to sidestep the issue of Palestinian "return," in order to avoid 
complicating an already formidable task and interrupting the momen-
tum of the peace process. 13 As a result, although the issue of Palestinian 
9 /d. art. XXX(2). 
1° Fatah is the largest faction of the PLO. Headed by Vasser Arafat, Fatah, which literally 
translates to mean "victory" or "conquest," is the only major faction within the PLO which 
supports the current peace process. See NEIL C. LIVINGSTONE & DAVID HALEVY, INSIDE THE PLO 
72 (1990); DAVID MAKOVSKY, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLO: THE RABIN GOVERNMENT's ROAD 
TO THE OSLO AcCORD 2 (1996). 
11 Amira Has & Uri Nir, Arafat to Be Sworn In Today as President of Council, HA' ARETZ, Feb. 12, 
1996, at A1 (Hebrew original). 
12 A year and a half prior to the D.O.P., and pursuant to the Madrid peace talks, multilateral 
negotiations on the refugees were begun in Moscow. Few substantive developments have emerged. 
JOEL PETERS, BUILDING BRIDGES: THE ARAB-ISRAELI MULTILATERAL TALKS 1, 18 (1994). For the 
multilateral approach to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and in particular the working group on 
refugees, see generally id. at 1-41; Rex Bryn en & Jill Tansley, The Working Group of the Middle 
East Multilateral Peace Negotiations, PALESTINE-IsR.]. OF PoL., EcoN. & CuLTURE, Autumn 1995, 
53-58. Despite the fact that the multilateral talks are an integral part of the peace process, little 
is known about them. These multilateral talks were designed to bring together Israel, its imme-
diate Arab neighbors and the wider circle of Arab states in the Persian Gulf and the Maghreb 
region to discuss issues of regional concern. PETERS, supra, at 3. 
13 For a discussion of the "Principled Negotiation" technique used in the interim agreements 
to emphasize common interests, see Justus R. Weiner, Peace and Its Discontents: Israeli and 
Palestinian Intellectuals Who Reject the Current Peace Process, 29 CORNELL INT'L LJ. (forthcoming 
Fall 1996). 
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"return" appears in the D.O.P.,14 as well as in the Cairo15 and Oslo II16 
agreements, it is not dealt with in a comprehensive manner. Moreover, 
even where the agreements touched upon the question of "return," 
they largely ignored the specific problems that will likely beset its 
implementation. 
a. The 1948 Refugees in the Interim Agreements 
The 1948 refugees, their spouses and offspring pose perhaps the 
thorniest problem in the entire peace process. This problem stems 
from the large number of people involved, possibly millions, and from 
their aspiration to return to homes and lands within the pre-1967 Six 
Day War ( 196 7 War) fran tiers of Israel. Wary of establishing precedents 
concerning the Palestinian refugees from the 1948 War, both sides 
have staunchly adhered to their original positions, which will be dis-
cussed infra in Section II(B) of this article. As a consequence, neither 
the D.O.P. nor any of the four subsequent interim agreements substan-
tively address the issue of the 1948 refugees. Instead, consideration of 
this issue was postponed to the permanent status negotiations. 
Some fifteen years previously, on September 17, 1979, Egyptian 
President Anwar Al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin 
signed the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" (Framework 
Agreement) in context of the Camp David negotiations. 17 Pursuant 
thereto it was agreed, "Egypt and Israel will work with each other and 
with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a 
prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the 
refugee problem."18 Professor Yehuda Z. Blum observed, ''While this 
provision apparently refers to the refugees of 1948, it is rather vague 
in that it seems to commit the parties only to the establishment of 
14 See D.O.P., supra note 4, art. V, at 1528-29. 
15 See Cairo Agreement, supra note 5, art. XVI (2), at 634. 
16 The Final Clauses section of the Oslo II Agreement states: 
Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than 
May 4, 1996, between the Parties. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover 
remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, 
borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common 
interest. 
Oslo II, supra note 8, art. XXXI (emphasis added). 
17 A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David, reprinted in THE ARAB-Is-
RAELI CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DoCUMENTS 195, 195 (Ruth Lapidoth & Moshe 
Hirsch eds., 1992) [hereinafter Framework Agreement]. 
18 !d. art. A(4), at 198. 
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agreed procedures rather than to the resolution of the refugee problem 
itself."19 In any event this never came to fruition as the Palestinians 
boycotted the entire Camp David process.20 
b. The 1967 Displaced Persons21 in the Interim Agreements 
The D.O.P. provides a general structure for approaching the issue 
of the Palestinians displaced during the 1967 War. 22 It states in Article 
XVI (2), 'The Continuing Committee shall decide by agreement on the 
modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent 
disruption and disorder. "23 Its language on the outcome, however, is 
inexplicit and fails to provide any detail on the resolution of the 
displaced persons issue.24 Moreover, the negotiators were unable to 
reach agreement on even preliminary matters such as the definition 
of "displaced person" and the modalities for their absorption and 
repatriation. Even so, pursuant to the D.O.P. the parties formed a 
Continuing Committee made up of members from Israel, the PLO, 
Egypt and Jordan to consider the various aspects of the displaced 
persons issue. 
Interestingly Section A(3) of the above-mentioned Framework 
Agreement from the Camp David era provides, "During the transi-
tional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-gov-
erning authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by 
agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displace[d] from 
the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 .... 25 For the reason mentioned the 
committee was never constituted until the idea was revived in the 
D.O.P.26 
19 Yehuda Z. Blum, From Camp David to Oslo, 28 lsR. L. REv. 211, 219 (1994) (emphasis in 
original) [hereinafter Blum, From Camp David]. 
20 Justus R. Weiner, Human Rights in the Israeli Administered Areas during the Intifada: 1987-
1990, 10WIS. lNT'LLJ.l85, 191 (1992). 
21 The Palestinians who moved from the West Bank to Jordan were not, technically, refugees 
because they held Jordanian citizenship. Hence they are referred to as "displaced persons." See 
infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text. 
22 See D.O.P., supra note 4, art. XV1(2), at 1534. 
23 !d. 
24 See id. 
25 FrameworkAgreement, supra note 17, art. A(3), at 198. 
2fi D.O.P., supra note 4, art. XII, at 1532. 
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c. Defining the Magnitude of the Problem: Counting Refugees 
and Displaced Persons 
7 
The dispute over the refugee and displaced persons issues is not 
restricted to their circumstances and causes. Israel and the Palestinians 
have consistently disagreed as to the magnitude of the return issue. 
Indeed, determining the criteria for inclusion is a sine qua non for 
calculating the number of persons whose fate is at stake. This number 
must be approximated as a necessary first step towards resolution of 
the return issue. 
Estimates of the number of 1948 refugees and 1967 displaced per-
sons as well as the total number of Palestinians with bona fide claims 
today diverge significantly. According to U.N. estimates the number of 
1948 refugees was approximately 604,000, about half of the Palestinian 
population living in Israel at the time. 27 Independent researchers, 
however, claim that the number is closer to 540,000.28 Arab states argue 
that the figure reaches 900,000.29 
Regarding the displaced persons, Israeli government reports main-
tain that only 250,000 people relocated to Jordan in the context of the 
1967 War,30 and further argue that this number includes a significant 
amount of "old" 1948 refugees who evacuated their residences for a 
second time. This differs from estimates of the U.N. Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA), however, which claims that there were 250,000 
"new" displaced persons, namely, people displaced for the first time in 
1967, a number which is further augmented by the displacement of 
175,000 "old" refugees who had settled in the West Bank after the 1948 
War.31 
The disparity between the various calculations of 1948 refugees and 
1967 displaced persons has widened over the decades. Conflicts over 
the precise definition of "refugee" and "displaced person," and the 
extent to which these Palestinians or their descendants and relatives 
27 SHLOMO GAZIT, THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM 3 (1995). 
28 TERENCE PRITTIE & BERNARD DINEEN, THE DOUBLE EXODUS: A STUDY OF ARAB AND jEWISH 
REFUGEES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 8-9 (n.d.). Of this number it is argued that 40,000 emigrated to 
distant states and never claimed refugee status or United Nations' (U.N.) aid, while a further 
70,000 successfully integrated into neighboring Arab countries. Consequently, it is argued that 
there was only a balance of 430,000 genuine refugees from the 1948 conflict. See infra text 
accompanying notes 30-36 (elaboration of tire numbers controversy). 
29pRITTIE & DINEEN, supra note 28, at 8. 
30 STATE OF ISRAEL GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE, THE REFUGEE ISSUE: A BACKGROUND PAPER 9 
(Oct. 1994) [hereinafter THE REFUGEE ISSUE]. 
31 PRITTIE & DINEEN, supra note 28, at 10. 
8 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX, No. 1 
by marriage have retained or acquired their refugee or displaced 
person status are crucial to the negotiations on the Palestinian return 
issue. UNRWA, for example, estimated that as of 1992 there were 2.7 
million Palestinian refugees. 32 Israel, however, has disputed this figure 
because it fails to distinguish between 1948 refugees and 1967 dis-
placed persons and does not deduct those refugees who either ob-
tained Jordanian citizenship or who were allowed to return to their 
homes under humanitarian programs initiated by IsraeP3 Conse-
quently, one Israeli researcher estimated that as of 1992, there were 
1.9 million Palestinian refugees. 34 At the other extreme, Palestinian-
American Professor Edward Said has claimed that there are almost four 
million refugees, although he offers no facts to substantiate his asser-
tion.35 The Palestinian position in the Continuing Committee negotia-
tions has been that the displaced persons and their offspring now 
number some 800,000.36 
2. The Political Reality Since the Declaration of Principles 
a. The Present Status of the Refugee and Displaced Persons Issues 
The foreign ministers and representatives of the members of the 
Continuing Committee first convened in Amman in March, 1995. 
Although the ministerial committee was supposed to meet every three 
months, it has yet to reconvene.37 Meanwhile the working meetings of 
32 GAZIT, supra note 27, at 3. 
33 !d. Various forms of fraud occur on a large scale basis. For example, there is a widespread 
practice of not reporting the death of family members to UNRWA so as not to lose ration cards. 
Moreover, Arab states have consistently opposed the checking of the relief rolls for false or 
duplicate registrations. See Syrkin, supra note 1, at 168-69. 
34 GAZIT, supra note 27, at 3. He obtained this figure by deducting from the UNRWA total the 
approximately 800,000 Palestinians who live in Jordan, as Jordanian citizens, and in outside 
refugee camps. !d. 
35 EDWARD W. SAID, PEACE AND ITs DISCONTENTS: EsSAYS ON PALESTINE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
PEACE PROCESS 131 ( 1995). 
36 Jon Immanuel, Refugee Talks Could Set Precedent, jERUSALEM PosT, Mar. 7, 1995, at 2 [here-
inafter Refugee Talks]. Israel claims that only Palestinians exiled in person as a result of the war 
should be considered displaced. Conversely, the Palestinian side stresses that a right of return 
which does not include spouses, descendants, and other close relatives is meaningless. Palestinians 
Displaced as a Result of the 1967 War, ARTICLE 74, Apr. 1995 (published by the Alternative 
Information Center/Project for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights) [hereinafter Palestini-
ans Displace!l]. 
37 Interview with Yael Ronen, Member of the Israeli Delegation to the Committee of Technical 
Experts at the Talks on Displaced Persons, in Jerusalem (June 17, 1996) [hereinafter Ronen 
Interview). 
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the Continuing Committee have, for the most part, been marked by 
acrimony regarding all the issues on the agenda, i.e., the definition of 
"displaced persons," determining the number of displaced persons, the 
modalities for their admission, and the deadline for their return.38 
Moreover, given that these talks will establish precedents liable to 
impact future negotiations concerning the 1948 refugees, both sides 
have shown little flexibility. 
At the initial meeting the Arab delegations attempted unsuccessfully 
to ground the talks in international law and U.N. General Assembly 
and Security Council resolutions on the matter.39 At Israel's insistance, 
however, the parties agreed that the frame of reference for the talks 
would be the D.O.P., as well as relevant provisions in the Jordanian-Is-
raeli Peace Treaty and the Camp David Accords.40 In an effort to make 
headway on the refugee issue, the Committee divided the 1967 dis-
placed persons into four categories: (1) those who temporarily left the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip immediately prior to the war; (2) those who 
became refugees as a result of the war; (3) those expelled by Israel 
during its administration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and ( 4) 
those that have not been granted entry and claim that they lost their 
permits or identity cards while abroadY While the Palestinian negotia-
tors claim that those in all four of these classes should be characterized 
as "displaced persons," Israel limited its definition to those in the 
second category, i.e., those refugees who resided in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip during 1967 and were displaced during the war as a result 
of the fighting. 42 Moreover, the first six meetings of the Committee 
38 Jon Immanuel, Talks on Displaced Palestinians Open in Beersheba, jERUSALEM PosT, June 8, 
1995, at 2 [hereinafter Talks on Displaced Palestinians]; Palestinian Refugee Talks in Egypt Make 
Progress, jERUSALEM PosT, Feb. 15, 1996, at 3 [hereinafter Palestinian Refugee Talks]. 
39 Uri Nir, Disappointment Among Palestinian Delegation Regarding Final Statement of Committee 
on 1967 Displaced Persons, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 8, 1995, at AI (Hebrew original). 
4Q STATE OF ISRAEL GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE, QUADRILATERAL MEETING IN AMMAN: STATE-
MENT OF THE MEETING (Mar. 8, 1995) (press bulletin). 
41 See Fate of Refugees Still in Doubt, jERUSALEM TiMES, Dec. 30, 1994, at 8. 
42 Palestinian Refugee Talks, supra note 38, at 3; Yossi Turpstein & Dan Abitan, Progress in Latest 
Round of Talks on 1967 Displaced Persons, DAVAR R:isHoN, Feb. 15, 1996, at 2 (Hebrew original). 
The Israeli argument is that since the D.O.P. defines the mandate of the Continuing Committee 
as establishing the "modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip in 1967," categories three and four are automatically excluded. Ronen Interview, supra note 
37 (emphasis added). As for category number one, Israel claims that, strictly speaking, these 
persons were not "displaced" as a result of the war, and that therefore they do not fall within the 
scope of the Committee's mandate. ld. In addition, following the Committee's mandate, it must 
also agree upon the "necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder." !d. This supports 
Israel's claim that security considerations must figure prominently in the negotiation of an 
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stalemated over the issue of defining a displaced person. Consequently, 
the Committee was unable to arrive at a clear estimate of the number 
of displaced Palestinians entitled to return. 
The Palestinians contend that the number of displaced persons, 
including their offspring, far exceeds the number that Israel has been 
willing to countenance.43 However, progress was achieved in February, 
1996 when the Committee agreed to assess the number of displaced 
persons based on estimates produced by Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the 
PLO, as well as international groups active in the region such as 
UNRWA and the International Committee of the Red Cross.44 Headway 
has not been made toward determining the number of displaced 
persons, the procedures for their admission, or the deadline for their 
return.45 
Despite the fact that the parties formally launched permanent status 
negotiations on May 5, 1996,46 as scheduled in the previous agree-
ments, no substantial progress has been achieved regarding the status 
of the Palestinian refugees. Indeed the negotiations were almost im-
mediately adjourned and have yet to be reconvened.47 In fact, the 
parties have not officially held any talks regarding the status of the 1948 
refugees. This inactivity is mainly the result of political uncertainty in 
the wake of Binyamin Netanyahu's election victory on May 29, 1996, 
less than a month after the opening of the negotiations. 
arrangement concerning the displaced persons. Hence, there is a need, from Israel's standpoint, 
to limit the number of persons entitled to return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the 
interim period. As an informed Israeli observer remarked: 
!d. 
[T]here's no clear border between these areas [the West Bank and Gaza Strip] and 
Israel .... [E]verything that happens there immediately affects what happens in Israel 
.... Even today, part of the problem with Gaza is that there are too many people there, 
no infrastructure, not enough work ... they cannot survive; the first place they turn to 
is Israel, whether it be for work or terrorist activities. 
43 See Refugee Talks, supra note 36, at 2. Israel claims that only Palestinians exiled in person as 
a result of the war should be considered displaced. Conversely, the Palestinian side stresses that 
a right of return which does not include spouses, descendants, and other close relatives is 
meaningless. Palestinians Displaced, supra note 36; see also infra text accompanying notes 60-63. 
44 Palestinians Displaced, supra note 36. 
45 Talks on Displaced Palestinians, supra note 38, at 2; Palestinian Refugee Talks, supra note 38, 
at 3. 
46 Guy Bechor, Palestinians Require State with Jerusalem as its Capital at Permanent Status 
Negotiations, HA' ARETZ, May 6, 1996, at A1 (Hebrew original). 
47 Ragheb Maraya, Likud Snubs Oslo Retrospective, JERUSALEM TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at 3. 
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b. Israel's Policy Towards Palestinian Repatriation 
Despite the fact that under the present interim agreements, Israel 
has not allowed the PA to adopt its own immigration and repatriation 
policies,48 since the signing of the D.O.P. Israel has generally acqui-
esced to Palestinian demands for repatriation to the PA-administered 
areas.49 Pursuant to this liberal policy,50 Israel not only allowed thou-
sands of Palestinians who overstayed their visitor permits to remain in 
the PA-controlled territories, but has permitted numerous displaced 
persons to reenter, including a number of persons expelled for security 
offenses.51 Thus far, over 84,000 Palestinians have been granted resi-
dency (including 15,000 who have overstayed their visitor's permit) in 
the self-governing areas during the interim period.52 The most con-
spicuous example of this policy was Israel's granting of residency to 
virtually all of the members of the Palestinian National Council (in-
48 Oslo II, supra note 8, annex III, art. 28(11). Indeed, the PAis forbidden to grant permanent 
residency in the self-ruled areas without the prior approval of Israel. !d. 
49 The Silent Migration to 1967 Occupied Palestine, ARTICLE 74, Apr. 1996 (published by the 
Alternative Information Center/Project for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights). Many Pal-
estinians who fail to obtain Israeli approval for an extension of their visitor's permit choose 
nonetheless to remain illegally in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Many of these do so because 
they are unable to return to the country of their previous domicile, like Libya or Kuwait. Others 
have been denied family reunification by the Israeli authorities. These illegal immigrants are 
willing to take the risk of staying because they know that Israel will not enter the Gaza Strip and 
the populated centers in the West Bank in order to carry out massive expulsions. !d.; Interview 
with IngridJaradat, Alternative Information Center/Project for Palestinian Residency & Refugee 
Rights, in Jerusalem (June 18, 1996) [hereinafter Jaradat Interview]. 
50 Examples of this policy include Israel's allowance of six hundred Palestinian refugees to 
immigrate from Lebanon; its incorporation of two hundred Palestinians stranded on the Egyp-
tian-Lebanese border by Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi (in an effort to punish and humiliate 
the PLO for reaching an agreement with the Jewish state) to enter into the autonomous areas; 
and its policy over the last three years of repatriating approximately two thousand families a year 
(close to ten thousand people) within the framework of family reunification to return to the 
autonomous areas. See Miles Crawford, Qaddafi Expels 30,000 Workers, JERUSALEM TIMES, Sep. 15, 
1995, at 7; Refugee Talks, supra note 36, at 2; Israel Allows 177 Palestinians Expelled from Lilfya to 
Enter Strip, DAVAR RrsHON, Sep. 28, 1995, at 3 (Hebrew original); Uri Nir, Palestinian Authority 
to Reconsider its opposition to Bypass Roads. 8 Expelled Families from Lilfya Allowed to Enter Strip 
as a "Humanitarian Gesture," HA' ARETZ, Nov. l, 1995, at A3 (Hebrew original); Palestinians from 
Lebanese Refugee Camps Are Going to Israel, DAVAR RrsHoN,Jan. 29, 1996, at l (Hebrew original); 
Mubarak Asks Qadhafi to Reconsider Expulsion of Palestinians (BBC shortwave broadcast, Arab 
Republic of Egypt Radio, May 29, 1996). 
51 Included in this number are several hundred persons expelled for security offenses who now 
work as Palestinian policemen and PA officials. Refugee Talks, supra note 36, at 2; Eytan Rabin & 
Gideon Alan, Security Apparatus Considering Possibility of Evacuating Six Cities in West Bank Uy 
End of 1995, HA'ARETZ, July 4, 1995, at Al (Hebrew original); Danny Rubinstein, The Little 
Return, HA'ARETZ, Sep. 23, 1994, at B3 (Hebrew original). 
52 Jaradat Interview, supra note 49. 
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eluding unrepentant terrorists opposed to the peace process and the 
existence of Israel) to attend its meeting held in April, 1996. At this 
assembly the articles of the Palestinian National Covenant that are 
inconsistent with the peace process were ostensibly amended.53 
Even if one disregards the security implications, Israel does have 
legitimate concerns regarding prospects for returning hundreds of 
thousands of mostly destitute persons from abroad to Palestinian-gov-
erned areas. Namely, the returnees would exacerbate the already dan-
gerous shortage of employment and housing. Recent reports from 
PA,54 Israeli,55 and U.N.56 sources indicate that Arafat's administration 
is teetering on the edge of economic collapse with, in relative terms, 
a huge budget deficit and very high unemployment. 57 The PA currently 
cannot properly provide for the existing population in the areas it 
administers. It follows, therefore, that the peace process can only 
become more precarious if Israel were to acquiesce in the return of 
large numbers of additional homeless and indigent people that the PA 
appears unable to absorb. 
c. The Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement-An Abortive Blueprint 
for Compromise 
Despite meager progress in the formal channels, a document out-
lining the main points of a tentative final agreement on the return 
issue was secretly negotiated prior to the Labor Party's loss in the May 
29, 1996 Israeli elections. This agreement, which has not been made 
53 Alouf Ben et a!., Israel Will Allow PNC Members to Enter Territories for Vote on Amending 
Covenant, HA'ARETz,Jan. 21, 1996, at AI (Hebrew original); see also Covenant Puzzles, jERUSALEM 
PosT, Apr. 26, 1996, at 4; Amira Hess & Sami Soukol, PNC Annuls Articles in Palestinian Covenant 
Negating Israel's Right to Exist, HA' ARETZ, Apr. 25, 1996, at AI (Hebrew original); Jon Immanuel, 
Fatah Report: Covenant Frozen not Amended, JERUSALEM PosT, May 22, 1996, at 1. 
54 David Harris, PA: Closure Will Cost $600m. in J996,jERUSALEM PosT, Aug. 25, 1996, at 2. 
According to a report of the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction, 
unemployment stands at 40 percent in the West Bank and 51 percent in Gaza. This unemploy-
ment has caused a reduction in tax revenues for the PA. Id. 
55 According to an Israeli journalist who visited Gaza to meet with Arafat, 'The depressing 
economic deprivation that we saw- primarily the result of overpopulation, PA fecklessness and 
corruption, and the six-month-long closure-is a problem that can only be addressed effectively 
with a large measure oflsraeli cooperation and goodwill." Yosef Goell, Clueless in Gaza,]ERVSALEM 
POST, Aug. 23, 1996, at 4. 
56 jon Immanuel, UN Coordinator: PA Near Financial Collapse, JERUSALEM PosT, Aug. 15, 1996, 
at 2 [hereinafter UN Coordinator]. 
57 Id. 
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public, was negotiated between Abu Mazen58 and Yossi Beilin. 59 Accord-
ing to reports of the Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement, Israel agreed to 
recognize a Palestinian "right of return" on the condition that the 
returning Palestinians would reside in the future Palestinian entity.60 
Under this understanding, Israel agreed to offer financial assistance to 
help resettle Palestinian refugees in neighboring countries and to 
compensate Palestinians for property lost during the 1948 War.61 
Given the seeming irreconcilability of the Israeli and Palestinian 
positions during the preceding decades, however, it is surprising that 
even a tentative agreement was reached.62 Although then Foreign Min-
ister Shimon Peres did not condone the tentative agreement, his dis-
approval stemmed from reservations about the possibility of eventual 
Palestinian sovereignty over the Jordan River Valley, Jerusalem and the 
future Palestinian entity's ties with Jordan, and not the provisional 
resolution of the refugee issue.63 Although the Labor Party was de-
feated at the polls, this agreement may shed some light on the parties' 
capacity for compromise on the issue of the 1948 refugees. 
d. The Policy of the New Netanyahu Government 
The election victory of Israeli Likud Party Chairman Binyamin N e-
tanyahu and the formation of his right-wing coalition government 
dampened hopes that the Beilin-Abu Mazen understanding would lead 
to progress on the refugee and displaced persons issues. Under Israel's 
present government, it may prove more difficult to achieve progress in 
the permanent status talks in general, and on the 1948 refugee issue, 
in particular. Following the new government's guidelines, which one 
PA minister characterized as a "declaration of war"64 against the Pales-
58 Mahmoud Abbas, better known as Abu Mazen, was named the head of the Palestinian 
negotiating team at the permanent status talks. He is also Arafat's most senior deputy in the PA. 
Pinchas Inbari, Abu Mazen Moves up the PA Ladder, jERUSALEM POST, May 29, 1996, at 4. 
59 Yossi Beilin was the Israeli Minister of Finance during this stage of the Rabin-Peres govern-
ment. 
60 See Beilin: Israel was Ready to Accept a Palestinian State, JERUSALEM PosT, Aug. 1, 1996, at 12 
[hereinafter Beilin]; Steve Rodan & Bill Rutman, Of Talks & Traps, jERUSALEM PosT, May 3, 
1996, Magazine, at 8. 
61 See UN Coordinator, supra note 56, at 2. 
62 Abu Mazen and Beilin are leading doves of the respective camps. 
63 Beilin, supra note 60, at 12. 
64 Jon Immanuel & Sarah Honig, PA Ministers: Likud's New Guidelines 'Declaration of War,' 
jERUSALEM PosT, june 9, 1996, at 1. 
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tinian people, the Netanyahu government rejected Palestinian claims 
to sovereignty over any part of the West Bank, Gaza Strip or Jerusalem, 
advocated a policy of increased Israeli settlement in these areas and 
conditioned the continuation of the peace process upon the fulfill-
ment by the Palestinian side of its commitments under the agree-
ment.65 Arafat himself recently made a similar claim before a special 
session of the Palestinian Legislative Council when he asserted that the 
Netanyahu government had "declared war against the Palestinians."66 
Rhetoric aside, with regard to the issue of "return," the Netanyahu 
government's initial position was categorical. According to the guide-
lines it published when it took office, the new government "will oppose 
'the right of return' of Arab populations to any part of the Land of 
Israel west of the Jordan River."67 Fidelity to this position would make 
it difficult to reach a compromise to ameliorate the plight of the 
Palestinian refugees and displaced persons. 
Given this general trend, it is unlikely that the terms of the Beilin-
Abu Mazen agreement will be implemented in the near future. Despite 
the fact that the Beilin-Mazen understanding was reached during the 
term of the previous government, the possibility that it will still form 
the basic framework for resolution of the refugee issue should not be 
ruled out. Nevertheless, the complex nature of the peace process 
requires the careful consideration of the terms of any agreement be-
tween the parties, even if it was reached by members of the party who 
are no longer in power. 
In reality, however, there is no difference between the previous 
Labor government's position and that of Netanyahu's Likud govern-
ment regarding the Palestinian refugees.68 Following a number of 
65 The New Gavernment's Guidelines, JERUSALEM PosT, June 18, 1996, at 3. The new Israeli 
government's insistence that the PA keep to all its commitments is perceived as a pretext to stall 
the peace talks. Indeed, in spite of the public and private urging by the previous Labor govern-
ment, the PA repeatedly violated the agreements it signed with Israel. See Justus R. Weiner, Hard 
Facts Meet Soft Law-The Israel PLO Declaration of Principles and the Prospects of Peace: A Response 
to Katherine W. Meighan, 35 VA.J. INT'L L. 931, 948-51 (1995) [hereinafter Weiner, Hard Facts]; 
Evelyn Gordon, Peace Watch: Arafat Never Banned llamas, Islamic jihad, JERUSALEM PosT, Aug. 
6, 1996, at 2; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text. It must be said that Israel too, albeit 
to a lesser extent, violated the interim agreements during the course of the peace process. See 
PEACE WATCH, LEGAL OPINION: OsLO DOES NoT ESTABLISH LINK BETWEEN ISRAELI PULLOUT 
FROM HEBRON AND AMENDING OF PALESTINIAN COVENANT (Mar. 28, 1996); Weiner, Hard Facts, 
supra at 951-52. 
66 Jon Immanuel & Michael Yudelman, Arafat: Israel has Declared War On Us, JERUSALEM PosT, 
Aug. 29, 1996, at 1. 
67 The New Government's Guidelines, supra note 65, at 2. 
68 One Israeli authority observed, ''The [Israeli] political establishment is unanimous in denying 
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recent declarations, the Likud government indicated a willingness to 
pursue talks on all of the issues addressed by Oslo. As a result, there 
is a strong chance that Netanyahu's hard-line rhetoric merely repre-
sented preliminary posturing in order to strengthen his negotiating 
position.69 Therefore the Likud government is more likely to be flex-
ible on this issue than its initial statements indicated. 
B. Differing Perspectives on the Refugee Question 
1. The Palestinian Position 
a. The Palestinian Version of the 1948 Arab Exodus 
The dispute over the source of the Palestinian refugees and dis-
placed persons is reflected in conflicting historical assessments. Each 
side allocates the blame to acts by the other side, or alternatively 
attributes the origins of the problem to circumstances beyond its con-
trol. Professor Avi Schlaim remarked, "But the point ... is that there 
can be no agreement on what actually happened in 1948."70 It is worth 
pointing out that "modern Arab historiography ... is fueled by the 
vast gap between reality and self-image, and between the memory of a 
glorious past and a dissatisfYing present that evokes neither pride nor 
self- esteem. "71 
The traditional Palestinian position is that Israel is totally responsible 
for the Palestinian exodus of 194 7-1948. Most pro-Palestinian narra-
tives claim that the Palestinian evacuation resulted from a carefully 
designed Israeli campaign to drive the Arabs out of Palestine.72 Pales-
any "right" to return to Israel. GAZIT, supra note 27, at 9. A Palestinian academic involved in the 
negotiations wrote, "On the issue of refugees, however, there seems to be a consensus among 
both Likud and Labor to reject any substantive concessions towards the Palestinians." Salim 
Tamari, Refugees Under the Likud, JERUSALEM TIMES, June 28, 1996, at 5. 
69 See, e.g., David Makovsky, How the Secret Tarks Unfolded, JERUSALEM PosT, Sept. 2, 1996, at I. 
70 Avi Schlaim, The Debate About 1948, 27 Iwr'LJ. MIDDLE EAST STun. 287, 287 (1995). 
71 Avraham Sela, Arab Historiography of the 1948 War: The Quest for Legitimacy, in NEw PER-
SPECTIVES ON ISRAELI HISTORY 124, 124 (Lawrence]. Silberstein ed., 1991) (citing Elie Kedourie). 
72 See, e.g., Walid Khalidi, The Fall of Haifa, MIDDLE EAST FoRUM, Dec. 1959, at 22-32 [here-
inafter The Fall of Haifa]; I.F. Stone, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, Aug. 3, 1967, at 10. "It was, in fact, less 
of a miracle than it was the culmination of over half a century of effort, plans, and (in the end) 
brute force." NuR MASALHA, ExPULSION OF THE PALESTINIANS: THE CONCEPT oF "TRANSFER" IN 
ZIONIST POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1882-1948, at 175 (1993). "(l)t is difficult-in light of the system-
atic nature of the 'clearing out' operations and the sheer magnitude of the exodus (not to 
mention the careful efforts to prevent the return of the refugees)-not to see a policy at work." 
!d. at 180. Others, including Edward Said and Walid Khalidi, claim that the idea of expelling the 
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tinian historians place particular emphasis on the Deir Yassin massacre 
which they assert was indicative of a Jewish conspiracy to rid Palestine 
of its Arab inhabitants.73 Deir Yassin, an Arab village located next to a 
major thoroughfare connecting Jerusalem to the coast, was attacked 
by members of the Irgun and Stern militias. 74 The April 9, 1948 attack 
resulted in the death of many Arab civilians. The incident and the 
panic and fear it generated was compounded by Arab distortions re-
garding the extent of their casualties75 and the threat of future vio-
lence.76 They claimed that Deir Yassin was a deliberate Israeli ploy to 
evoke terror among the Palestinian populace and convince them to 
flee to neighboring Arab states. This claim, however, is undermined by 
noting that the evacuation of the Sharon coastal plain, following the 
order of the Arab Higher Committee, was completed prior to the 
attack on Deir Yassin.77 Whether by design, distortion or confusion, the 
story of Deir Yassin had a devastating effect on Arab morale and is 
recognized as a significant cause of the later stages of Palestinian 
flight. 78 
The plight of the 1948 Palestinian refugees was exacerbated by the 
outbreak of the 1967 War. A significant number of these refugees had 
settled in territory which came under Israeli control during the 1967 
War. The hostilities, particularly in the West Bank, caused many of 
these refugees to evacuate their homes for a second time and move to 
refugee camps in neighboring Arab countries, principally Jordan. At 
the same time additional Palestinian Arabs who had originally been 
living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were uprooted from their 
Arab Palestinians-the notion of forcible 'transfer'-is inherent in Zionism from its very incep-
tion, and that in 1948 the Zionists simply seized the opportunity to displace and dispossess the 
Arab inhabitants of the country. See Schlaim, supra note 70, at 295; Sela, supra note 71, at 145. 
n See PRITTIE & DINEEN, supra note 28, at 7. 
74 These groups were right-wing Jewish militias. 
7" The Irgun and Stern Militias have consistently denied the atrocities of which they have been 
accused by the Arabs of Deir Yassin. Apologists have claimed that the loss of life in Deir Yassin 
resulted from Arab opposition to the attack and the failure to heed the call made by the Jewish 
forces to evacuate the village. See j. BOWYER-BELL, TERROR OuT OF ZION 366-72 (1977); LARRY 
COLLINS & DOMINIQUE LAPIERRE, 0 JERUSALEM! 266-76 (1973); DAN KURZMAN, GENESIS 1948, 
at 138-49 (1970). The Israeli government repeatedly condemned the killings at Deir Yassin and 
imprisoned the Jewish leaders responsible for them. See HowARD SACHAR, THE CouRSE OF 
MoDERN JEWISH HISTORY 589 (1990). Moreover, although frequently proffered as evidence of 
Jewish atrocities, its notoriety is actually attributable to its rarity in the history of Jewish relations 
towards the Arabs in Palestine. Radley, supra note 1, at 593. By contrast, Arab propaganda from 
that period often boasted of atrocities committed and threatened further similar attacks. /d. 
7° CHRISTOPHER SYKES, CROSSROADS TO ISRAEL, 1917-1948, at 352-53 (1973). 
77 Syrkin, supra note 1, at 161. 
7R PRITTIE & DINEEN, supra note 28, at 7. 
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homes, creating a new problem commonly referred to as the "dis-
placed persons" issue. 79 The distinction between "refugees" and "dis-
placed persons" is that the 1948 refugees evacuated their homes and 
entered a different sovereign entity, while the West Bank residents in 
1967 did not enter a different sovereign entity.Ro As with the 1948 
exodus, Palestinian explanations offered as to the cause of the displace-
ment of persons in the 1967 War claim that these residents were 
forcibly removed from their homes in the context of an Israeli cam-
paign to expand its borders.s1 
b. The Role of Return in Palestinian Nationalism 
In the decades following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the misery of 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon served as the pri-
mary catalyst for Palestinian nationalism. The Palestinian nationalist 
movement grew as additional Palestinians became displaced during 
and following the 1967 War, the Lebanese Civil War and the Gulf War 
of 1990-1991. These and other factors led to the widespread emer-
gence among Palestinians of a belief in a right to return as the act of 
faith which, until the D.O.P., unified the diverse factions of the Pales-
tinian movement. Recent developments, however, indicate that the 
Palestinian "return" question has taken on a more divisive tone. Since 
the signing of the D.O.P., the Palestinian left has regularly accused 
Arafat of selling out the interests of the Palestinian refugees.R2 As a 
79 The origin of the term "displaced persons" traces back to the aftermath of World War II in 
the context of the work done by international relief organizations to assist people who had been 
deported from their own countries. In 1975 the U.N. General Assembly. in Resolution 3455, used 
the term to refer to humanitarian aid provided by the U.N. High Commissioner in the Indo-Chi-
nese Peninsula. Professor Goodwin-Gill explains that the term's use (as in 1967) to refer to people 
who had crossed an international frontier was somewhat of a misnomer and that "displaced 
persons" is commonly accepted as describing people who have been displaced within their own 
country. Blum, From Camp David, supra note I 9, at 219 (citing G.S. GooDWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW il-10 (l9il3)). The rights of the 1967 displaced persons are further diluted 
by the effects of the Jordanian Citizenship Law which grantedjordanian citizenship to Palestinian 
"refugees" residing in Jordan, and thereby, it is argued, the 1967 displaced persons forfeited 
whatever refugee "rights" they may have claimed on account of their exodus in 1947-194il, or 
their displacement in 1967. 
80 It is important to note that between 1948 and 1967 Jordan claimed sovereignty over the West 
Bank. Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: l'i.Pjlections on the Status of judea and Samaria, 3 
lsR. L. REv. 279, 283 (1968). As a result, there is a significant distinction between the refugees 
of 1948 and those Palestinian residents of the West Bank who in 1967 relocated from the West 
Bank to the eastern side of the Jordan River. 
HI See PETER YOUNG, Tm: ISRAELI CAMPAIGN 1967, at 169 (1967). 
82 See, e.g., SAm, supra note 35, at 84. 
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result, conflict over this issue plays a major role in both Israeli-Pales-
tinian and intra-Palestinian politics.83 
c. The Evolution of the Palestinian Goal of Return 
The Palestinians originally hoped that their return would take place 
following the "liberation" of Palestine by the Arab armies.84 This goal 
is clearly expressed in the PLO Covenant, which states that: "Armed 
struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine .... The Palestinian Arab 
people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to ... 
work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their coun-
try and their return to it."85 June, 1974, however, witnessed a major 
shift in the PLO's ideology. Recognizing the apparent futility of their 
campaign to destroy Israel militarily, the PLO called for a ten-point 
Provisional Political Program (also known as the 'plan of phases' or 
'stages'), authorizing the establishment of a Palestinian state on "any 
[piece of] Palestinian territory that is liberated. "86 
This "phased" plan penetrates to the heart of Israeli concerns as to 
the Palestinians' ultimate motives regarding the current peace process 
in general and the refugee issue in particular. Opponents of the peace 
process contend that the Palestinian leadership secretly view the agree-
83 Id. at 131-34. 
84 GAZIT, supra note 27, at 4--5. 
85 The Palestinian National Charter of 1968, art. 9, reprinted in THE ARAB-IsRAELI CoNFLICT 
1087 (John N. Moore ed., 1977). It is unclear to what extent this article still forms part of the 
PLO Charter. Under the D.O.P. and subsequent Palestinian-Israeli agreements the Palestinian 
side is obligated to amend the Charter so as to reflect recent developments. In this context, the 
Palestinian National Council (PNC) convened on April 24, 1996, ostensibly in order to amend 
all articles of the Charter that denied Israel's right to exist or were inconsistent with commitments 
made by the Palestinians in the recent agreements. There is some dispute, however, as to whether 
as a matter of fact or law the necessary amendments were made. Justus R. Weiner, An Analysis of 
the Oslo II Agreement in Light of the Expectations of Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas, 17 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. 667, 690-95 (1996). 
86 Resolution of the Arab Summit Conference, reprinted in THE ARAB-IsRAELI CoNFLICT AND 
ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 17, at 156, 156. The idea of a Palestinian 
state alongside Israel was not a radical departure from the PLO's original ideological position, 
as put forth in the Covenant, but rather was a new way to achieve their central goal, i.e., the 
"liberation" of Palestine. This new state would serve as a basis for launching attacks against the 
State of Israel. As Professor William V. O'Brien explains: 
Under the "two-phase" plan the PLO would, first, establish a Palestinian state in any part 
of Palestine it could obtain-phase one. Thereafter, this Palestinian state would serve 
as the base for a continued armed struggle, ultimately leading to the recovery of all of 
Palestine and the liquidation of Israel, as demanded by the covenant. 
WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, LAW AND MORALITY IN ISRAEL'S WAR WITH THE PLO 9 (1991). 
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ments with Israel establishing a Palestinian autonomous entity in parts 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as the fulfillment of only the first 
phase of their strategy.87 Despite international commitments to the 
contrary, it is argued that once such an entity is consolidated, it will 
become a base for attacks aimed at the destruction of the State of Israel 
and the creation in its place of a Palestinian state. Similarly, the claim 
to a "right of return" is evidence of a Palestinian intention to put into 
motion their "phased" plan. 
This plan, however, can also be understood as a moderation of 
Palestinian "return" aspirations. Thus, although it states that "the right 
of return is at the forefront of Palestinian rights,"88 Israeli academic 
Shlomo Gazit89 notes that efforts to achieve recognition for a right of 
return as the Palestinians' primary goal, together with the PLO's post-
ponement of the total liberation of Palestine, heralded the beginning 
of a new Palestinian policy, in which the refugees no longer aspired to 
return to their original homes and lands, but rather, to a distinct future 
Palestinian entity.90 Another indication that the Palestinian stance on 
refugees and displaced persons had significantly softened came in 
1988. That year the nineteenth Palestinian National Council (PNC) 
adopted a Declaration of Independence which anchors the Palestinian 
"right of return" in the resolutions of the U.N. and states that a 
"[s]olution to the Palestine refugee problem [is to be reached] in 
accordance with United Nations resolutions on that subject."91 By ac-
cepting these resolutions, the Palestinian leadership significantly de-
parted from its longstanding position according to which it refused to 
87 YECHit:L M. LEITER, CRISIS IN ISRAEL: A PEACE TO RESIST 24-27 (1994). 
88 The acceptance of the first stage, a Palestinian entity on that part of their claimed territory 
that is initially obtained, is conditioned on the continuation of the struggle against Israel. Article 
3 of the PNC program adopted in Cairo in 1974 reads: 
The PLO will struggle against any plan for the establishment of a Palestinian entity the 
price of which is recognition, conciliation, secure borders, renunciation of the national 
right, and our people's deprivation of their right to return and their right to determine 
their fate on the national soil. 
YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI, ARAB STRATEGIES AND ISRAEL'S RESPONSE 38 (1977). 
89 Gazit is a Senior Research Associate at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv 
University. During his previous career in the IDF he served as Coordinator of Israeli Activities in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Director of Military Intelligence. 
90 See GAZIT, supra note 27, at 5-6; Rashid I. Khalidi, Observations on the Right of Return,]. PAL. 
STUD., Winter 1992, at 29, 34 [hereinafter Khalidi, Observations]. 
91 Political Communique and Declaration of Independence iJy Palestine National Council, reprinted 
in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 17, at 
344, 349. 
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accept key U.N. resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict (inter alia, 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338) 92 because they related to 
the Palestinian plight as a refugee problem rather than as that of a 
people with a distinct identity whose national rights had been denied.93 
At the nineteenth PNC meeting, the Palestinians began to accept a 
number of compromises which circumscribed their "right" of return. 
Two of the most significant of these compromises stem from the Pal-
estinian leadership's acceptance of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 
194 as establishing the framework for the exercise of this "right." This 
resolution, which was adopted on December 11, 1948, affirms: 
The General Assembly ... resolves that the [Palestinian] refu-
gees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with 
their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest 
practicable date and that compensation should be paid for 
the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of 
or damage to property which, under principles of interna-
tional law or in equity, should be made good by the Govern-
ments or authorities responsible.94 
Palestinian acceptance of this resolution is significant on two levels. 
First, the Palestinian leadership no longer insists upon world recogni-
tion of an absolute right of return and no longer rejects financial 
9~ S.C. Res. 338, U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1747th mtg., at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF /29 & Add.1 (1973); 
S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF /22/Rev.2 (1967) 
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 242]. 
9~ Point Four of the Seven Points Passed by the Central Committee of Al Fatah in January, 1969 
explains the Palestinian rccjection of U.N. Resolutions: 
Al Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement categorically rejects the Security 
Council Resolution of 22 November 1967 and the Jarring Mission to which it gave rise. 
This resolution ignores the national rights of the Palestinian people-failing to men-
tion its existence. Any solution claiming to be peaceful which ignores this basic factor, 
will thereby be doomed to failure. 
In any event, the acceptance of the resolution of 22 November 1967, or any pseudo-
political solution, by whatsoever party is in no way binding upon the Palestinian people, 
which is determined to pursue mercilessly its struggle against foreign occupation and 
Zionist colonisation. 
WALTER LAQUEUR, THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER 372-73 (3rd ed., 1976). 
94 G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (concerning the 
report of the U.N. Mediator and establishing a Conciliation Commission) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 
194]. Interestingly enough, the Arab states voted against the resolution, out of a concern that 
their support would be interpreted as an acceptance of Israeli sovereignty and a willingness to 
negotiate a peace agreement, albeit through the conciliation commission. SHAMAI CAHANA, THE 
CLAIM OF A "RIGHT TO RETURN" FOR PALESTINIANS AND ITS MEANING FOR ISRAEL 13 (1993) 
(pamphlet published by the Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations, Hebrew Univer-
sity, Jerusalem) (Hebrew original); Radley, supra note 1, at 600-01. 
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compensation as a possible alternative to resettlement.95 Second, the 
Palestinian leadership accepted that only those who are willing "to live 
at peace with their neighbors," i.e., in accordance with Israeli law and 
international law, will be granted the right to return to their homes.96 
This acceptance demonstrates a more realistic approach because it 
implies acceptance of Israel as both a present and future fait accompli. 
In addition to acquiescing to the pre-conditions of U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution 194, Palestinian leaders such as Faisal Husseini 
and Nabil Shaath, while definitively insisting on the recognition of the 
principle of a "right" of return for all Palestinian refugees, deliberately 
use ambiguous language to describe the destination of their return. 
Largely as a result of this ambiguity, it can be inferred that they 
recognize that repatriating large numbers of Palestinians within Israel 
is unfeasible and that the Palestinians will not "return" to their original 
villages and homes, but instead to a future Palestinian state.97 Even so, 
this position has never been officially approved by the PNC, and a 
number of contradictory claims regarding the return of the Palestini-
ans into Israel have been voiced by prominent members of the Pales-
tinian leadership.98 
2. The Israeli Position 
a. The Israeli Version of the 1948 Exodus 
The traditional view held by Israeli policy-makers and academics is 
that most Palestinians left their homes during the 1948 War either 
95 GAZIT, supra note 27, at 5-6; Khalidi, Observations, supra note 90, at 35-36. Ziad Abu Zayyad, 
a member of the Palestinian Council wrote the following concerning the Palestinian "right to 
return" and the peace process: 
The 1948 refugees ... realize that the current peace process will not allow them to 
return to their homes and lands inside Israel. They know the limitation of this process. 
It is for this very reason that some of them are reluctant to support it. Others would 
accept a return to national dignity and statehood barring an actual return to a specific 
geographic location. But no refugee will be ready to forget the private property left 
behind. If no actual return to homes and lands is possible, no one has the right or the 
authority to give up these homes and lands on their behalf. 
Ziad Abu Zayyad, Seekingjustice, PALESTINE-IsR.j. OF PoL., EcoN. & CuLTURE, Autumn 1995, at 
6, 7. 
96 GAZIT, supra note 27, at 6; Khalidi, Observations, supra note 90, at 36. 
97 GAZIT, supra note 27, at 6; Khalidi, Observations, supra note 90, at 36; see also DANNY 
RUBENSTEIN, THE FIG TREE EMBRACE (1989) (affirming that this generation of Palestinians does 
not aspire to return to their old homes in Israel but rather to a new Palestinian state) (Hebrew 
original). 
98 Safi Gabai et a!., Arafat: "At End of Talks All the Refugees Will Return to Their Homeland 
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because of a general sense of fear and confusion99 or because they were 
prompted to evacuate by Arab leaders. Israeli historians generally be-
gin their analysis of the flight of the 1948 refugees with a discussion of 
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 100 (Partition Resolution), which 
recommended the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states 
following the withdrawal of the British Mandatory authorities. The 
Partition Resolution was rejected by the Arabs of Palestine and Arab 
leaders throughout the Middle East101 but was accepted, albeit reluc-
tantly, by the Jewish community.102 Disgruntled with this Resolution, 
Palestinian Arabs increased attacks against Jewish targets. The violence 
which erupted after the Partition Resolution, while not in itself a 
unique occurrence, was significant because it contributed to the out-
break of the 1948 War. 
Some Israeli historians suggest that the escalation of hostilities in 
November, 1947, and the premonition that the violence would inten-
sify, created an atmosphere of panic and confusion amongst the Arabs 
of Palestine. 103 During the weeks following the Partition Resolution, an 
estimated 75,000 Arabs evacuated their homes. These Arabs consti-
tuted members of the Palestinian Arab community's elite and their 
exodus, which was motivated by a desire to escape the dangers of an 
imminent war, helped to set the stage for the more significant evacu-
ation that followed. There is evidence that the Arabs who departed 
Palestine in late 1947 and early 1948, i.e., the Arab elite, 104 which was 
comprised of businessmen, doctors, lawyers, teachers and other pro-
Palestine," MA'ARIV, July 7, 1995, at 9 (Hebrew original); Dafna Verdi eta!., Shaath: Israel Will 
Have to Consent to Return of 100,000 1948 Refugees to the Galilee, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 7, 1995, at AI 
(Hebrew original). 
99 The fear and panic that surfaced among Arab civilians was in large part a result of exagger-
ated reports, disseminated by Arabs sources, of violent acts perpetrated by the Jews. See BENNY 
MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM 114 (1987); SYKES, supra note 76, 
at 352. 
100 G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 128th plen. mtg., at 131, U.N. Doc A/519 (1948). 
IOI See, e.g., SYKES, supra note 76, at 325. 
102 SeeNADAV SAFRAN, ISRAEL: THE EMBATTLED ALLY 32 (2d. ed., 1981). 
103 COLLINS & LAPIERRE, supra note 75, at 338; HOWARD SACHAR, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL: FROM 
THE RISE OF ZIONISM TO OUR TiME 333 (1993) [hereinafter HISTORY OF ISRAEL]; SYKES, supra 
note 76, at 331-32. 
104 0nJanuary 30, 1948 the Palestinian Arab newspaper As Shaab chastised the first wave of 
refugees comprised of wealthy individuals as follows: 
The first group of our fifth column consists of those who abandoned their houses and 
business premises to go to live elsewhere. Many of these lived in great comfort and 
luxury. At the first sign of trouble they took to their heels in order to escape sharing 
the burden of the struggle, whether directly or indirectly. 
Syrkin, supra note 1, at 160-61. 
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fessionals, were instructed to do so by the local Palestinian command-
ers as well as the Higher Arab Committee. This initial and voluntary 
exodus indubitably constituted a significant factor in the subsequent 
flight of Arab civilians, since "it sapped morale, rent the fabric of 
Palestinian society, and set the scene for an expanding exodus 
ahead. "105 Professor Howard Sachar observed: 
The most obvious reason for the mass exodus [prior to the 
Declaration of the State oflsrael] was the collapse ofPalestine 
Arab political institutions that ensued upon the flight of the 
Arab leadership-at the very moment when that leadership 
was most needed. The departure of mukhtars, judges, and 
cadis from Haifa and the New City of Jerusalem, from Jaffa, 
Safed, and elsewhere, dealt a grave blow to the Arab popula-
tion. The semi-feudal character of Arab society rendered the 
illiterate fellah almost entirely dependent on the landlord 
and cadi, and once this elite was gone, the Arab peasant was 
terrified by the likelihood of remaining in an institutional 
and cultural void. 106 
According to the classical Israeli view, the subsequent flight of several 
hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs can be attributed to the panic at 
the time and to the call by Palestinian Arab leaders107 and heads of 
neighboring Arab states108 to clear the way for Arab invasion forces. 109 
Israeli historians also note instances in which Palestinian Arabs evacu-
105 MARK Tt:SSU:R, A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 303 (1994). 
106 HISTORY OF IsRAEL, supra note 103, at 332; see also Benny Morris, Debate on the 1948 Exodus: 
Response to Finkelstein and Masalha,J. PAL. STun., Autumn 1991, at 98, 100 [hereinafter Morris, 
Debate]; Shabtai Teveth, The Palestine Arab Refugee Problem and Its Origins, MIDDLE EASTERN 
STUD., Apr. 1990, at 214, 224. 
107Syrkin, supra note 1, at 159-66. One contemporary American observer who in 1948 inter-
viewed Israeli Arabs and their leaders that had not departed wrote, "The Arabs agreed that the 
villagers who had fled could have stayed as they themselves had stayed, but the refugees had 
'listened to the mufti' [Haj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem and president of the 
Supreme Muslim Council, was the preeminent Palestinian leader from the 1920s to the 1940s] 
.... " Id. at 159. 
108 Professor Syrkin noted: 
Apparently, what began as a calculated move degenerated into irrational frenzy. The 
development of the exodus as well as Arab statements indicate that the flight was at first 
stimulated by the Arab leadership .... An additional reason was no doubt the desire 
to evacuate Arab civilians from territory which the Arab states expected to bomb. But 
the smooth functioning of this scheme was impaired by the very completeness of its 
success. A planned evacuation turned into a hysterical stampede. 
Syrkin, supra note 1, at 160. 
109 A succinct assessment was offered by the Jordanian daily newspaper al-Difaa on September 
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ated their homes as an expression of opposition to the establishment 
of a Jewish state110 and to the prospect of living under Jewish rule.m 
In Haifa,112 for example, negotiations betweenJewish and Arab leaders 
over the terms of Arab surrender of the town in April, 1948 concluded 
with an Arab refusal to remain in the city under Jewish rule, despite 
pleading on the part of the Jewish leadership for them to remain. 113 
Further, the panic which precipitated the departure of some 70,000 
Arabs from Haifa undermined the morale of the entire Arab popula-
tion of Palestine. 114 This contributed to an atmosphere of hysteria in 
which whole villages were abandoned even before they were threat-
ened by the progress of the war. 115 
There was no overall Israeli plan to drive the Arabs from their 
homes. 116 In recent years, however, a number of Israeli historians have 
offered a revised explanation of the Palestinian exodus. The main 
argument of these "revisionists" is that Israel had a role in spurring the 
Palestinian departure in certain locales. One such historian is Benny 
Morris. Morris has written critically, for example, of the expulsion of 
60,000 Arab residents from the towns of Lydda and Ramle.117 He 
acknowledges, however, that the expulsion was strategically motivated 
6, 1954: "The Arab governments told us, 'Get out so that we can get in.' We got out, but they did 
not get in." !d. at 166. 
110 In time of war "adherence to the enemy" is generally a capital offense, even in western 
democracies. See Julius Stone, Self-Determination and the Palestinian Arabs, in ISRAEL, THE ARABS 
AND THE MIDDLE EAST 200, 215 (Irving Howe & Carl Gershman eds., 1972). 
111 CONOR C. O'BRIEN, THE SIEGE 301 (1986); HISTORY OF IsRAEL, supra note 103, at 332; 
TESSLER, supra note 105, at 302; Morris, Debate, supra note 106 at 98, 100; Teveth, supra note 
106, at 223. Evidence for official Jewish encouragement for Palestinian Arabs to remain in 
Palestine is also found in Israel's proclamation of independence which calls for "the Arab 
inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the up building of the State 
on the basis of full and equal citizenship .... " Declaration of the Establishment of the State of 
Israel, reprinted in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 85, at 934, 937. 
112 O'BRIEN, supra note Ill, at 301; HISTORY OF ISRAEL, supra note 103, at 332; TESSLER, supra 
note 105, at 302; Morris, Debate, supra note 106, at 98, 100; Teveth, supra note 106, at 223. 
113 DAVID KiMCHE, A CLASH OF DESTINIES 122 (1960); see also SYKES, supra note 76, at 353-54; 
Syrkin, supra note 1, at 162-63. 
114 Syrkin, supra note 1, at 163-64. 
115 See id. at 164. Beginning in April, 1948 the Arab populations of Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberias and 
Safad as well the Arabs residing in numerous smaller towns and villages voluntarily evacuated. 
Radley, supra note I, at 589. 
116 !d. at 594; Syrkin, supra note 1, at 165. Had there been such a plan it is unlikely that, 
immediately following the cessation of hostilities in 1948, approximately 30,000 refugees would 
have infiltrated Israeli-held territory and remained. See DoN PERETZ, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINE 
ARABS 55 (1958). 
117BENNY MORRIS, 1948 AND AFTER 1-5 (1994). 
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by military exigencies. 118 It should be mentioned, however, that many 
historians reject the views of the revisionists as politically motivated. 119 
Moreover, they argue that the extent of the expulsions by Israeli forces 
was limited,120 that the Arab forces did not permit any Jews to remain 
in the areas they captured, 121 and that decisions to evacuate certain 
locales were made by individual commanders rather than at the higher 
echelon. 122 
Contemporary reports absolved Israel of responsibility for the Pales-
tinian exodus during and after the 1967 War. For example, a New York 
Times reporter reporting from Jordan wrote, "At no time during a 
number of long talks with Arabs in this area was anything said to 
support Arab charges at the United Nations that thousands had been 
forced to cross the Jordan River from the West Bank area occupied by 
the Israelis."123 Another reporter in Amman wrote, "The refugees said 
llHfirst, Lydda and Ramie were located next to the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway and the 
residents of these towns regularly interdicted Jewish traffic. Second. augmented by elements of 
the Jordanian Arab Legion, these towns constituted a springboard from which the Arabs intended 
to attack Tel Aviv. Third, the unit of the Israel Defense Forces that captured Lydda numbered 
only several hundred, yet was surrounded by tens of thousands of Arabs. Fourth, many of the 
homes in these towns were being used as sniping positions. !d. at 2. Also, this occurred during 
the siege of Jerusalem in which the Jordanian Arab Legion had cut off the city's main water 
supply. Syrkin, supra note 1, at 164. 
119 See Efraim Karsh, Rewriting Israel's History, MIDDLE E.Q., June 1996, at 19, 19. 
120 These forcible expulsions were isolated incidents, occurred late in the fighting, and involved 
numbers too small to affect the scope of the mass flight or to explain it. Syrkin, supra note 1, at 
163. 
121 According to Netanel Lorch, who founded the Military History Division of the Israel Defense 
Forces, far from being the result of some dark conspiracy, the Arab refugee problem arose from 
the inexorable nature of the struggle. Whoever decided to use force to cut the Gordian knot 
"had to be aware-in fact, was aware-that a refugee problem would result ... ofJewish refugees 
should the Arabs prevail, of Arab refugees in the contrary event. It was the Arab side that took 
that fateful decision." Alex Berlyne, Shield of Zion: The Israel Defense Forces, JERUSALEM PosT, May 
28, 1993, Magazine, at 26 (reviewing NETANEL LORCH, SHIELD OF ZION: THE IsRAELI DEFENSE 
FoRcEs (1993)). However many Arabs stayed on in the areas conquered by the Jews while no 
Jews were permitted to remain in Arab-occupied areas. Thus, for example, every Jewish resident 
was driven out of Beit Ha'arava, Kalya, Gush Etzion, Hartuv, Mishmar Ha'yarden, Masada, 
Nitzanim and Yad Mordechai. !d. Lorch observed, 
Indeed they [the Jews] rightly considered themselves lucky to be able to get out alive. 
One wonders what role was played by Arab projection of patterns of conduct. Did they 
expect that their fate under Jewish rule would not be different from that which would 
have befallen Jews if the situation were reversed? 
!d. By contrast, in places where the Arabs did not flee they came to no harm. Radley, supra note 
1, at 594. 
!22 See Syrkin, supra note 1, at 165. 
123 Sydney Gruson, War Brings Problems for '48 Palestinian Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1967, 
at 12. 
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that they had not been driven out but that the Israelis had merely let 
it be known that buses were available to take them to the bridge. "124 
Other commentators have claimed that the majority of West Bank 
residents who fled to Jordan left in the midst of the panic and confu-
sion that surrounded the outbreak of the 1967 War. 125 Additional dis-
placed persons continued to stream out weeks after the shooting 
stopped. 126 
Considering the political advantages that a voluntary exodus poses 
to Israeli interests, it is hardly surprising that Israeli policy makers have 
traditionally promoted this understanding of history. 127 If the exodus 
is interpreted as purely voluntary, Israel can avoid moral accountability 
124 Dana A. Schmidt, Jordanians Count 200,000 Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, .June 17, 1967, at 3. 
125 See DAVID PRYCE-JONES, THE FACE OF DEFEAT: PALESTINIAN RJ:FUGEES AND GUERRILLAS 
10-12 (1972). The correspondent for the English newspaper during the 1967 War who inter-
viewed departing Palestinians at the Allenby Bridge observed: 
[T]he claims and the counter-claims of 1967 are as far beyond resolution as those of 
1948. In the last resort, even present facts right there on the Allenby Bridge depended 
upon trust .... 1n some cases they [the departing Palestinians] had explanations: 
husbands or breadwinners were in other Arab countries and the families would be 
reunited over there; some did not want to live under the .Jews; some had heard of the 
destruction of the Latrun villages and thought their turn would come. It was not that 
they were immediately afraid of the Israelis for as often as not they had met none until 
that very day. 
!d. at 10-11. 
126 Syrkin, supra note l, at 111. A journalist observing the departing Palestinians wrote: 
!d. 
If the Israelis permitted the refugees to trek on foot, they were accused of callous 
indifference, and when they provided transport they were accused of systematic eviction. 
Had they forbidden departures, they would have been tyrants. In such a position nothing 
they did could be right .... 
127 Palestinian sources insist that the departure of the Palestinians was the result of a calculated 
effort of the .Jews to drive them out. See, e.g., The Fall of Haifa, supra note 72, at 22-32. But see 
a contemporary British article in the London Economist on October 2, 1948, which stated: 
During the subsequent days the Israeli authorities who were now in complete control 
of Haifa ... urged all Arabs to remain in Haifa, and guaranteed them protection and 
security. So far as I know, most of the British civilian residents whose advice was asked 
by Arab friends told the latter they would be wise to stay. Various factors influenced their 
decision to seek safety in flight. There is but little doubt that far the most potent of 
these factors was the announcements made over the air by the Arab Higher Executive 
urging all Arabs in Haifa to quit. The reason given was that upon the final withdrawal 
of the British, combined armies of the Arab States would invade Palestine and drive the 
.Jews into the sea, and it was clearly intimated that those Arabs who remained in Haifa 
and accepted Israeli protection would be regarded as renegades. 
Syrkin, supra note l, at 163 (quoting a British eyewitness account). 
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for the refugees' plight. This places Israel in a far stronger negotiating 
position than if it incited or augmented the Palestinian exodus. 
b. Israel's Position on the 1948 Refugees 
Israel's position on the 1948 Palestinian refugees has remained con-
stant. Israel has always held that the refugee issue should be resolved 
within the framework of a comprehensive peace settlement with the 
Arab world. 128 As a result, Israeli governments have consistently re-
jected proposals which advocated the unconditional repatriation of 
Palestinian refugees. Moreover, to the extent that Israel was willing to 
consider Palestinian financial losses, it simultaneously sought recipro-
cal compensation for the property left behind by the hundreds of 
thousands of Jewish refugees who were forced to leave Arab countries 
during the 1940s and 1950s.129 In this regard, Israeli Prime Minister 
David Ben-Gurion declared on August 1, 1948: 
When the Arab states are ready to conclude a peace treaty 
with Israel this question [of refugees] will come up for con-
structive solution as part of the general settlement, and with 
due regard to our counterclaims in respect of the destruction 
of Jewish life and property, the long-term interest of the 
Jewish and Arab populations, the stability of the State of Israel 
and the durability of the basis of peace between it and its 
neighbors, the actual position and fate of the Jewish commu-
l2H THE REFUGEE ISSUE, supra note 30, at 4. 
129 An important, though often neglected dimension of the refugee issue is the plight of Jewish 
refugees from Arab states that fled to the newly-established State of Israel in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Jews from Yemen, Iraq, Libya and Syria were all victims of anti:Jewish riots and looting, as well as 
police measures specifically directed against them, such as arrests and imprisonments. The 
intense and pervasive nature of these measures led to a virtual disappearance of the Jewish 
communities in every Middle Eastern country except Morocco and Turkey (whose Jewish com-
munities declined dramatically but did not vanish). In this regard it should be noted that these 
communities were large and long-established, many predating the advent oflslam in the seventh 
century and some dating back to Biblical times. 
The large majority of the new Jewish immigrants to Israel arrived in their ancestral homeland 
destitute as a result of the widespread policy among Arab rulers of either expropriating their 
property or conditioning their departure upon its forfeiture to the state. In some instances the 
Jewish community was compelled to sell its property at distress prices due to economic measures 
that were discriminately imposed upon them by the local governments, thereby suffering tremen-
dous financial loss. See NOAH LUCAS, THE MODERN HISTORY OF IsRAEL 272-73 (1974); MAURICE 
M. RoUMANI, THE CASE OF THE JEWS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES: A NEGLECTED IssUE 1-8 (1983); 
HISTORY OF ISRAEL, supra note 103, at 396-403; NORMAN STILLMAN, THE jEWS OF ARAB LANDS 
IN MODERN TIMES 149-75 (1991). 
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nities in the Arab countries, the responsibilities of the Arab 
governments for their war of aggression and their liability for 
reparation, will all be relevant in the question whether, to 
what extent, and under what conditions, the former Arab 
residents of the territory of Israel should be allowed to re-
turn.130 
It is important to note that no form of compensation has ever been 
offered by these Arab states for the weighty losses inflicted upon the 
Jews. This is true even in the current era when diplomatic and trade 
relations have been established with many of these states. 131 Further-
more, it should be remembered that the D.O.P. speaks of refugees 
generally, not just Palestinian refugees. 132 Interestingly, the lsrael:Jor-
dan Peace Treaty supports this more two-sided approach. It states that 
the parties, "recognizing the massive human problems caused to both 
parties by the Arab-Israel conflict" undertook to "seek to ... alleviate 
those problems ... [and] resolve them in appropriate forums, in 
accordance with internationallaw."133 
A crucial distinction exists between the treatment that Jewish refu-
gees received in Israel and that received by Palestinian Arabs who fled 
to neighboring Arab states. While the former group was welcomed and 
successfully absorbed, the latter group was isolated and, for the most 
part, kept in refugee camps until the present.134 As a result, it will no 
doubt be contended by some Israeli policy-makers that Israel should 
not, after voluntarily bearing the cost of successfully rehabilitating and 
integrating the Jewish refugees, now be called upon to incur the ex-
pense and security risk of solving the Palestinian refugee and displaced 
person problems. The Israeli position is further bolstered by the fact 
that Arab states, often motivated by political considerations, failed to 
exhibit corresponding generosity towards Palestinian refugees within 
their borders135 and thus should shoulder some of the burden of 
resolving the issue. 
130 THE REFUGEE IssUE, supra note 30, at 5. 
131 GAZIT, supra note 27, at 10-11. 
132 See D.O.P., supra note 4. According to Professor Yehuda Z. Blum, the "language of the D.O.P . 
. . . may be construed as applying both to the Palestinian Arab refugees displaced in 1948 and 
the Jewish refugees displaced from Arab lands who left their countries of residence either in the 
course of the Arab-Jewish (and subsequently Arab-Israel) hostilities of 1947-9 or in their wake 
.... " Blum, From Camp David, supra note 19, at 220. 
133 /d. 
134 See infra text accompanying notes 152-56. 
13" The Arab states had great resources which Israel lacked. Also, the Palestinian refugees often 
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Fearful of being inundated with thousands of Palestinians whose 
allegiance to the State would be doubtful, Israeli immigration and 
nationality legislation has blocked the mass return to Israel by the 
Palestinian refugees.l36 Thus, for example, under the Nationality Law 
of 1952,137 a person who resided in Palestine immediately prior to the 
establishment of the state is automatically considered a resident only 
if he was registered as a resident before March 1, 1952. This legislation 
was specifically designed to avoid awarding citizenship to Arabs who 
had left the country during the 1948 War and had returned illegally 
thereafter. 138 Similarly, the Law of Entry of 1952139 directly prohibits 
entry into Israel except for Israeli citizens or those authorized to enter 
by the Israeli Interior Ministry. In this way, the return of refugees to 
Israel without approval is rendered illegal under Israeli law, which 
allows for the deportation of unauthorized immigrants pursuant to the 
above-mentioned legislation. 
The Israeli legal system has also sought to deal with the demographic 
dimension of the refugee problem by seeking to encourage the immi-
gration to Israel of jews from the diaspora. In accordance with the Law 
of Return of 1950,140 citizenship is acquired automatically upon immi-
gration by a 'jew" as that term is defined within the legislation. These 
immigrants are entitled to special benefits directed at assisting their 
absorption into Israeli society. Not surprisingly, Palestinians object 
strenuously to this enticement for additional Jewish immigration. 141 
resettled not far from their original homes, had kin in the country where they were situated, 
spoke the language and knew the culture. This was not the case for the Jewish refugees. This 
disparity is all the more apparent given the rhetorical assertions of the Arab states that claimed 
"solidarity ... unites them with their Palestinian brethren." Seminar of Arab Jurists on Palestine, 
in I THE ARAB-ISRAELI CoNFLICT: READINGS 259, 359 (John N. Moore ed., 1974) [hereinafter 
Seminar]. 
136 See, e.g., Ariel Bin-Nun, THE LAw OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 15 (1992). The reasonableness 
of this statute is analyzed by Professor Ruth Lapidoth. See Ruth Lapidoth, The Right of Return in 
International Law, with Special Reference to the Palestinian Refugees, 16 lsR. Y.B. ON HuM. RTs. 103, 
121-23 (1986) [hereinafter The Right of Return]. 
137Nationality Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50 (1951-52). 
138 Bin-Nun, supra note 136, at 41. 
139£ntry into Israel Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 159 (1951-52). 
140 LawofReturn, 1950,4L.S.I.ll4 (1949-50). 
141 Palestinian opposition to Jewish immigration has taken various forms over the decades, 
including denying the historical authenticity of the Jewish claim to the land, isolating and 
condemning Israel at the U.N., pressuring governments to prevent their citizens from emigrating 
to Israel, staging terrorist attacks against immigrants en route to Israel, and most recently, in 
February, 1995, issuing a paper entitled jewish Immigration to Palestine and its Devastating Effects 
on the Peace Process. It is significant that this paper, written long after the D.O.P. and the Cairo 
Agreement were signed, was issued by the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Information. Struc-
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In sum, since 1948, the possibility of Palestinian "return" has been 
viewed by the Israelis as both a security142 and a demographic threat.143 
This fear has translated into a long-standing policy of Israeli non-ac-
quiescence to the Palestinians' comprehensive claims of a right of 
"return. "144 The favored Israeli solution was to permanently settle refu-
gees in neighboring Arab countries and to offer them compensation 
for their property losses.145 This "solution," however, has proven impos-
sible to implement. Despite Israel's fears and reservations, the Israeli 
government has already readmitted over 100,000 refugees and dis-
placed persons as a humanitarian measure, under the framework of 
tured around the new organizing idiom of the peace process, the paper repeats the claim that, 
"This task [aliyah] cannot be accomplished without the confiscation of more Palestinian land in 
the West Bank and Gaza." PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY MINISTRY OF INFORMATION PRESS 
OFFICE, PUB. No. 5, jEWISH IMMIGRATION TO PALESTINE AND ITS DEVASTATING EFFECTS ON THE 
PEACE PROCESS (Feb. 1995); see al50 Joel Bainerman, Russians, Da, Palestinians, La, jERUSALEM 
PosT, Apr. 12, 1991, at 16;Jonathan Kuttab, Why the Immigration of Soviet jews Must be opposed, 
MIDDLE EAST INT'L., Mar. 30, 1990, at 16. 
142 According to one assessment: 
That the Arab refugee chose to cast his lot with the Arab invaders of Israel is a matter 
of record. The aggression in which he joined in defiance of the partition resolution of 
the United Nations created new circumstances, and by no rational, legal, or moral 
standard could the fledgling unexpectedly victorious, be asked to welcome its enemies. 
There are, after all, some historical comparisons that are worth making. 
[It is] instructive to recall the attitude of the American revolutionaries toward the 
Tories who fled the thirteen colonies and made cause with the British. The founding 
fathers, notably Ben Franklin, objected not only to their return but to the granting of 
compensation for their confiscated estates. So long as the young republic was in danger, 
Franklin, who conducted the negotiations with the British in regard to the Tory refugees, 
refused to countenance their return. In 1789, he wrote of a group of loyalists who had 
settled in what was then British territory: "They have left us to live under the government 
of their King in England and Nova Scotia. We do not miss them nor wish their return." 
Though the loyalists were of the same stock as the revolutionaries and there was no 
scarcity of land for them to return to, the Americans were not disposed to trust in their 
good faith: "I believe the opposition given by many to their re-establishing among us is 
owing to a firm persuasion that there could be no reliance on their oaths." 
Syrkin, supra note 1, at 167-68 (quoting Benjamin Franklin in a letter dated june 26, 1785). 
143 GAZIT, supra note 27, at 8--10. In 1978, in assessing the validity of the Palestinian right to 
return under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Kurt Radley observed: 
[I]t can be fairly stated that the return of potentially some one and one-half million 
Palestinians of doubtful allegiance to a state whose population itself numbers only 
somewhat more than three million is as valid a threat to that state's "general welfare" 
as there is likely to exist. 
Radley, supra note 1, at 613. 
144 GAZIT, supra note 27, at 9-10. 
145 ld. at 10. 
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family reunification. 146 At this point, it remains unclear whether this 
policy will be continued by the Netanyahu government. 147 
3. The Arab States' Position on the Palestinian Refugees and 
Displaced Persons 
Although frequently critical of the Palestinians for fleeing, 148 for 
decades the Arab countries insisted upon nothing less than the return 
of all Palestinian refugees from the 1948 War to their original homes 
and villages. This return was to take place following the so-called 
"liberation" of Palestine by either the Arab countries or the Palestinian 
populace. The essence of the Arab states' original position on the 
refugees is expressed in a statement by the Egyptian Foreign Minister 
in 1949: "In demanding the restoration of the refugees to Palestine, 
the Arabs intend that they shall return as the masters of their home-
land, and not as slaves. More explicitly, they intend to annihilate the 
State oflsrael."149 A resolution adopted at a conference in Syria in july, 
1957 stated, "Arly discussion aimed at a solution of the Palestine prob-
lem which will not be based on ensuring the refugees' right to annihi-
late Israel will be regarded as a desecration of the Arab people and an 
act of treason. "150 In the same vein, Egyptian President Nasser declared 
in 1961: "If the refugees return to Israel, Israel will cease to exist. "151 
Using this rationale, all Arab states with the exception of Jordan152 
refused citizenship to Palestinians residing within their borders. Most 
Arab leaders reasoned that resettling Palestinians was tantamount to 
146CAHANA, supra note 94, at 20-22, 28, 32. 
147 See supra text accompanying notes 64-69. 
148 On july 9, 1948 Egyptian King Farouk stated his criticism of "the Palestinian Arabs who ran 
away leaving their houses and lands behind .... " Syrkin, supra note 1, at 166. 
149Jsi LEIBLER, Tm: CASE FOR ISRAEL 45 (1972). 
I 50 Syrkin, supra note 1, at I 69. 
151 M.S. ARNON!, RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 129 (1968); see also 
TESSLER, supra note 105, at 308. 
152 ADDITIONAL LAw TO UoRDANIAN] CITIZENSHIP LAw, art. 2 (Feb. 16, 1954), reprinted in 3 
STATUTES IN ARAB COUNTRIES 2 (Israel Military Advocate General's Office trans., 1974) (Hebrew 
original); UoRDANIAN] CITIZENSHIP LAW, art. 3(3) (Dec. 20, 1949), reprinted in 3 STATUTES IN 
ARAB CouNTRIES, supra, at 5. It is widely understood that jordan's decision to grant citizenship 
to the refugees stemmed not from charitable intentions toward them, but rather from its govern-
ment's traditional ambition to achieve recognition for its efforts to annex the land designated 
for the Palestinian Arabs in the Partition Resolution. The Hashemite Kingdom's policy to absorb 
the refugees was thus established in order to assimilate the Palestinian Arabs and to, as a result, 
eradicate the concept of a Palestinian people. See Amira Shagev, Who Wants the Refugees, the 
Displaced Persons and Those Late in Coming Back, HA'ARETZ, July 25, 1994, at B2 (Hebrew 
original). 
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renouncing Arab claims to Palestine. Out of an overt hostility toward 
Israel, they deliberately refused to resettle Palestinian refugees in an 
effort to maintain their refugee status and to keep the Palestinian issue 
alive in the world's consciousness.153 In 1958, the former Director of 
UNRWA, Ralph Galloway, was so disgusted with the Arab countries' 
refusal to resettle and absorb the Palestinian refugees that he declared: 
"The Arab states do not want to solve the refugee problem. They want 
to keep it as an open sore, as an affront to the United Nations, and as 
a weapon against Israel. Arab leaders do not give a damn whether Arab 
refugees live or die. "154 In this regard, Professor Bernard Lewis ob-
served: 
In what then does this uniqueness [of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict] lie-this special sense of outrage which after almost 
forty years is still unappeased? Some see its cause in the 
displacement of the Palestinians from their homes to the 
neighboring Arab countries, where great numbers of them 
still live in refugee camps. Whatever the causes-whether they 
were expelled by the Israelis, urged to go by their own leaders, 
or simply fled in panic as the war exploded around their 
homes-there can be no doubt about the immensity of the 
human tragedy which befell them, and about the suffering 
which they have endured from then till now. 
But the intractability of the Palestinian refugee problem is 
a consequence, not a cause, of the political problem. That the 
problem was not solved, like others elsewhere in our brutal 
century, by a combination of resettlement and some repatria-
tion, was due to an act of will on the part of the Palestinian 
leadership and of the Arab states. It was indeed a considerable 
feat to have preserved the refugee camps and their unhappy 
153 CAHANA, supra note 94, at 17-18. 
154 Terence Prittie, Middle East Refugees, in THE PALESTINIANS: PEOPLE, HISTORY, POLITICS 71, 
71 ( 1975). In 1949, within the framework of the Conciliation Commission, the Arab states refused 
to consider implementing an economic development program advanced by the United States 
that would have provided new financial opportunities for the refugees as well as facilitated their 
absorption. Similarly, in 1955, the Arab countries rejected the United States-initiated Johnston 
Plan which called for a joint irrigation project between Israel, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. This 
project would have promoted employment for the refugees and encouraged their resettlement. 
Finally, in 1960, the United States, the principal donor of funds to UNRWA, attempted to no avail 
to persuade the Arab countries to take part in an economic development program to rehabilitate 
the refugees as well as foster growth in the region's overall economy. CAHANA, supra note 94, at 
20,24-25. 
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inhabitants for so long, and prevented their absorption into 
the expanding economies of the oil-rich Arab states, at a time 
when these were attracting and employing millions of guest 
workers from Egypt and Yemen, from Mrica, from India and 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and even from as far away as Korea 
and the Philippines. Iss 
33 
Instead the Arab states preferred to maintain the Palestinian refugees 
in abject misery as a vehicle to torment, embarrass and undermine 
support for the Jewish state. 156 Moreover, despite the improvement in 
relations between Israel and various Arab States, no Arab state has been 
willing to underwrite any of the significant costs that will likely be 
incurred in resolving the Palestinian return issue. This situation has 
persisted despite strong arguments indicating the multilateral nature 
of this issue following the Arab states' perpetuation of the Palestinians' 
misery as refugees and displaced persons. 
Although in the aftermath of the 1948 War certain Arab countries 
expressed a willingness to resettle Palestinian refugees in exchange for 
land acquired by the newly formed State of Israel, 157 Palestinians have 
always forcefully insisted that they not be treated as "refugees," but as 
a nation that has been denied its collective rights. From this stand-
point, certain Palestinian academics have argued that the Palestinians 
15" BERNARD LEWIS, SEMITES AND ANTI-SEMITES 237-238 (1986). According to estimates of the 
refugee commissions of the League of Nations and the U.N. there have been about 100 million 
refugees worldwide since 1900. Preuss, supra note 3, at 6. Yet only the Palestinians continue 
demanding to return long after the wars in which they were displaced ended. !d. 
156 See Julius Stone, Peace and the Palestinians, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CoNFLICT, supra note 85, 
at 136, 141. 
157 CAHAN A, supra note 94, at 5-6. Had resettlement been politically feasible it might have 
averted the decades of misery and uncertainty that have been the fate of many of the 1948 
refugees. One authority wrote: 
I hold the view that, political issues aside, the Arab refugee problem is by far the easiest 
postwar refugee problem to solve by integration. By faith, by language, by race and by 
social organization, they are indistinguishable from their fellows of their host countries. 
There is room for them, in Syria and Iraq. There is a developing demand for the kind 
of manpower they represent. More unusually still, there is the money to make this 
integration possible. The United Nations General Assembly, five years ago, voted a sum 
of 200 million dollars to provide, and here I quote the phrase, "homes and jobs" for the 
Arab refugees. That money remains unspent, not because these tragic people are 
strangers in a strange land, because they are not, not because there is no room for them 
to be established, because there is, but simply for political reasons which, I re-emphasize, 
is not my business to discuss. 
Syrkin, supra note 1, at 170 (quoting COMMISSION OF THE CHURCHES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
AND WoRLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES' ADVISER ON REFUGEES, REPORT OF DR. ELFAN REES (1957)). 
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have a "right to return" based on the "injustice" they suffered in 1948. 
In the words of prominent Palestinian-American academic Professor 
Rashid Khalidi: 
It may be difficult to grasp the extent to which the question 
of "return" is perceived by Palestinians as a moral issue, one 
of rights in the abstract, rather than one of a specific set of 
rights in the contractual sense. Acknowledgment of the right 
of return is seen as an acceptance in principle of the fact that 
the Palestinians are a people with national rights, among 
them the natural right to live in their ancestral homeland, 
and that a wrong was done to them as a people in preventing 
them from doing so. On the other hand, rejection of the right 
of return is seen as a denial of the Palestinians' peoplehood 
and rootedness in their homeland, and thus of the injustice 
they have suffered.158 
4. The Position of the United States on the Palestinian Refugees 
Since 1948 the U.S. position on the return issue has wavered be-
tween a firm support for partial repatriation of the Palestinian refugees 
to a neutral approach in which they sought only to help the parties 
resolve the problem between themselves. One example of the former 
policy occurred after the 1948 War, when the United States pressured 
Israel to agree to the recommendations of Count Folk Bernadotte, 159 
the U.N. Mediator on Palestine who stated that: 
The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in 
Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should 
be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, 
resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and pay-
ment of adequate compensation for the property of those 
choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by 
the United Nations conciliation commission .... 160 
To the dismay of the international community, Bernadotte was assas-
sinated in September, 1948 by Jewish terrorists.161 Because of this assas-
158 Khalidi, Observations, supra note 90, at 31-32. 
159 CAHANA, supra note 94, at 12. 
160 Progress &part of the United Nations Mediatar on Palestine Submitted to the Secretary-General 
far Transmission to the Members of the United Nations, reprinted in 3 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CoNFLICT: 
DocUMENTS 367, 371 (John N. Moore ed., 1974). 
161 HISTORY OF ISRAEL, supra note 103, at 338. 
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sination, what began as merely another conventional report issued by 
a U.N. mediator was now viewed by many as the '"political testament' 
of a man who had sacrificed his life for peace in the Holy Land. "162 
This view was reflected in the U.N. General Assembly vote on Decem-
ber 11, 1948, which drafted Resolution 194 on the basis of the sugges-
tions ofBernadotte, 163 when the vast majority of its members, including 
the United States, solemnly and unreservedly approved Bernadotte's 
program. 164 
At the Conciliation Commission mandated by U.N. General Assem-
bly Resolution 194, the United States assumed a key role in the pro-
ceedings, particularly with regard to progress on the refugee issue. 165 
Working documents of the U.S. State Department from this period 
reveal that American officials earnestly believed that Israel could even-
tually be persuaded to accept the repatriation of approximately a 
quarter of a million refugees. 166 That this aspiration was unrealistic was 
poignantly demonstrated in Israel's response to President Truman's 
threat on May 29, 1949 that "the U.S. will regretfully be forced to the 
conclusion that a revision of its attitude towards Israel has become 
unavoidable."167 Ben-Gurion retorted that due to security considera-
tions, Israel could not consent to the repatriation of such a large 
amount of persons hostile to its existence while even an armistice 
agreement, let alone a comprehensive settlement, had yet to be final-
ized between it and its neighbors. 168 Israel's economic hardship caused 
by its being compelled to absorb hundreds of thousands of Jewish 
refugees fleeing from persecution in Arab countries was also adduced 
by the Israeli leader as further grounds for its refusal to repatriate 
Palestinian refugees. 169 
This episode signalled a turning point in the Truman administra-
tion's policy concerning the Palestinian refugees. Following the Israeli 
government's dissention, the United States ceased to pressure Israel to 
comply with its views. As one-time U.S. Ambassador to Israel James 
MacDonald attests in his memoir: "The [next] American note aban-
162Jd. 
163Radley, supra note I, at 600. 
164 CAHANA, supra note 94, at 13; HISTORY OF ISRAEL, supra note 103, at 338-39. 
165CAHANA, supra note 94, at 17-19. 
166 Donald Neff, U.S. Policy and the Palestinian Refugees,]. PAL. STuD., August 1988, at 96, 104. 
167 !d. at 10&-07. In addition, the State Department had warned that loan funds would be 
withheld from the Jewish state if it did not agree to the return of 200,000 Palestpinian refugees. 
!d. at 107. 
168 CAHAN A, supra note 94, at 19. 
169 fd. 
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doned completely the stern tone of its predecessor . . More and 
more, Washington ceased to lay down the law to Tel Aviv."170 
Mter the 1967 War, the United States resumed its active peacemak-
ing role within the Israeli-Arab conflict. Following the war, President 
Johnson's administration fully supported171 Security Council Resolu-
tion 237, which, inter alia, called "upon the Government oflsrael ... 
to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas 
since the outbreak of hostilities."172 Then Secretary of State William P. 
Rogers echoed this position when he declared in an address given on 
December 9, 1969 that: 
There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the 
problem of those Palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 
1967 have made homeless. This human dimension of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict has been of special concern to the United 
States for over 20 years .... We are prepared to contribute 
generously along with others to solve this problem. We believe 
its just settlement must take into account the desires and 
aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the 
governments in the area. The problem posed by the refugees 
will become increasingly serious if their future is not resolved. 
There is a new consciousness among the young Palestinians 
who have grown up since 1948 which needs to be channelled 
away from bitterness and frustration toward hope and justice.173 
Rogers recognized the importance of allowing the refugees a role in 
the resolution of their predicament. He cautioned, however, that this 
solution must be weighed against the legitimate security and demo-
graphic interests of both Israel and the Arab countries. This position 
reflected the continued U.S. policy of supporting U.N. General Assem-
bly Resolution 194 and the principles it set forth for solving the prob-
l7°jAMES MACDONALD, MY MISSION IN ISRAEL 179-84 (1951). 
171 CAHANA, supra note 94, at 27. 
172 Security Council Resolution 23 7 Concerning Humanitarian Protection JCYr Civilians and Prison-
ers of War in the Area of the Middle East Conflict, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CoNFLICT, supra note 85, 
at 1056, 1057. Israel opposes Security Council Resolution 237 on the grounds that it requires the 
Israeli military government to ensure the return of the inhabitants which fled the area with-
out any regard whatsoever for Israel's security. The resolution is thus perceived as one-sided since 
it grants an absolute right of return to the displaced persons of 1967. Ronen Interview, supra 
note 37. 
173 William P. Rogers, A Lasting Peace in the Middle East: An American View, in THE ARAB-Is-
RAELI CoNFLICT, supra note 85, at 772, 777-78 (emphasis added). 
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lem of the Palestinian refugees. 174 Even so, it did not signifY an inten-
tion by the Nixon Administration to urge Israel to repatriate large 
numbers of Palestinian refugees. As Nixon pledged in a secret letter 
to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir: "[The U.S.] will not pressure 
Israel to accept a solution that could undermine the Jewish character 
of the State of Israel and endanger its security. "175 
Subsequent U.S. efforts to facilitate negotiations on the Palestinian 
refugees such as the Reagan Plan and the Schultz Initiative placed less 
emphasis on the political aspects of the refugee issue, and chose to 
limit their focus to the necessity of providing the refugees with finan-
cial assistance and urging an amelioration of their living conditions. 
This policy further reflects the neutral position adopted by the United 
States over the past two decades, in which the United States agreed to 
approve any solution to this issue that has been mutually agreed upon 
between Israel and the Arab countries. 176 
In 1992, a senior official in the administration of President Bush 
clarified the U.S. view by saying that General Assembly Resolution 194 
had been "superseded" by Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, 
thereby rendering it invalid. 177 This reinforced an earlier U.S. state-
ment that General Assembly Resolution 194 was not the basis for the 
Madrid Peace Conference which led to the current Oslo peace proc-
ess.r7s 
II. THE RETURN QUESTION EXAMINED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Repatriation Under International Law 
The PLO has often claimed a right of repatriation under interna-
tional law for the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons to which 
174CAHANA, supra note 94, at 33. 
175 GAZIT, supra note 27, at 14-15. 
176 Id. at 14. A particularly embarrassing incident occurred in connection with the Refugee 
Working Group established at the Madrid peace conference. In response to a question concern-
ing the U.S. position on the question of whether or not the Palestinian refugees' have a right to 
return, the State Department's spokesman said that the United States favors that option as a 
solution to the problem. Israel protested this expression of U.S. policy and the American repre-
sentative at the talks of the Group was compelled to reconcile the above-mentioned formulation 
of American policy and stressed that it is the U.S. view that the refugee issue, together with each 
of the methods for solution (repatriation, compensation and resettlement) should be negotiated 
in direct talks between the parties. CAHANA, supra note 94, at 66-67. 
177 David Makovsky, US: "Right of Return" Superseded, jERUSALEM PosT,july 1, 1992, at 1. 
11s Jd. 
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Israel has consistently objected.179 The PLO has supported this claim 
by referring to both international law and to specific resolutions of the 
U.N. General Assembly and Security Councii.l80 
International law has developed a number of general standards for 
returning and repatriating persons dislocated from their country or 
land of origin. 181 Worthy of examination in this regard are the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration), 182 the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949,183 and Article 12(4) of the 1966 U.N. 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 184 It is doubtful for the reasons 
discussed infra, however, whether these instruments provide a basis for 
specific Palestinians' claims for repatriation. 
Although widely regarded by international law scholars as repre-
senting principles and norms that are reflective of customary interna-
tional law,185 the origins of the Universal Declaration should not be 
disregarded. Initially adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, it has no 
legally binding effect in that resolutions of the General Assembly are 
merely recommendations to states. 186 Moreover, the elasticity of its 
Article 29(2) allows every state to limit the exercise of rights in the 
Universal Declaration where necessary to ensure "respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of mo-
rality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. "187 
179 See, e.g., David Makovsky, Palestinian Right of Return Will Never Happen: Shamir,]ERUSALEM 
PosT, May 14, 1992, at 2. 
180 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2851, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/8429 
(1971); G.A. Res 2792, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., 200lst plen. mtg., at 46, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); 
G.A. Res 2672, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 
2535, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2452, 
U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 21, U.N. Doc. No. A/7218 (1968). 
lSI IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 558-59 (4th ed. 1990). 
182 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. 
mtg., at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. 
183 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
184 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(4), G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, at 52, 54, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights]. 
185 RICHARD B. LILLICH & FRANK C. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF 
LAw AND PoLICY 65 (1979). International law can be divided into two categories: customary and 
conventional. In general, customary international law binds all nations. Conventional law has 
more limited applicability in that it binds only those states that have ratified it and, if required 
by the local legal system, transformed the treaty into municipal law. 
186 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (Jack Donnelly & Rhoda E. Howard eds., 
1987). 
187 Universal Declaration, supra note 182, art. 29(2), at 77. 
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Likewise Article 29(3) of the Universal Declaration, which specifies 
that "[t]hese rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations," can be mar-
shalled to support Israel's unwillingness to repatriate hundreds of 
thousands or even millions of Palestinians. This is because the U.N. 
Charter, inter alia, states in Article 1 ( 1) the purpose of "maintain [ ing] 
international peace and security," a goal that would arguably not be 
served by mass repatriation of hostile Palestinians to Israel.188 
Even a textual analysis of Article 13(2), which proclaims, "Everyone 
has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to 
his country"189 fails to support the Palestinian case for repatriation.190 
This follows from the fact that the Palestinian refugees were never 
citizens of Israel.l91 Nor do their offspring, most of whom have never 
188 U.N. CHARTER art. 1 'I 1. Other relevant objectives of the U.N. include the "removal of 
threats to the peace" (art. 1 1 1), the preservation of "sovereign equality" (art. 2 'I 1), the 
settlement of disputes "by peaceful means" (art. 2 'I 3), protecting the "territorial integrity" and 
"political independence" of all member states (art. 2 'I 4) and not interfering with "matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" (art. 2 1 7). See U.N. CHARTER arts. 
1-2. All of these purposes could arguably be threatened by a mass return of Palestinians. 
189 Universal Declaration, supra note 182, art. 13(2), at 74 (emphasis added). It may be beneficial 
to consider the PA as a sovereign entity because only then can it be subject to international law 
and censure, i.e., be held liable for human rights violations. Then there would be a clear 
international law grounding for insisting that the PA prevent dissident Palestinian factions from 
committing terrorist acts against Israel. As a result, in this respect at least, it would be beneficial 
for Israel to treat the Palestinian entity as a sovereign state even if it would strengthen Palestinian 
claims for repatriation. 
However, it is possible to argue that in light of the evolving international law norms prohibiting 
terrorism and the frequent Palestinian claims of statehood, conditioning of the Palestinian return 
on "living at peace" with Israel may be superfluous. See, e.g., European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, Europ. T.S. No. 90 (1976) (entered into force Aug. 4, 
1978). 
190 Despite this, every attempt to make a case for the right of Palestinian repatriation invariably 
cites this provision of the Universal Declaration. See Sami Hadawi, The Arab Refugees, in CRESCENT 
AND STAR 199, 201 (Yonah Alexander & Nicholas N. Kittrie eds., 1973); See Issa Nakhleh, The 
Liberation of Palestine is Supparted lJy International Law and justice, in 1 THE ARAB-ISRAELI 
CoNFLICT: READINGS, supra note 135, at 566, 572-73; Radley, supra note 1, at 612 (citing Vojin 
Dimitrijevic, Legal Position of Palestine Refugees, 19 REv. OF INT. AFF. 18 (1968)); Seminar, supra 
note 135, at 363; see also HENRY CATTAN, PALESTINE, THE ARABS AND ISRAEL (1969). 
191 See supra text accompanying notes 136-40. Most international law instruments are premised 
on state sovereignty. This poses a particular problem for the Palestinian refugees because the 
Palestinians constitute an emerging national entity that are not nationals of a current or displaced 
sovereign state. As to the displaced persons who moved across the Jordan River in 1967, they held 
Jordanian citizenship and were merely relocating within what was then claimed to be the bounda-
ries of that state. Hence, they fall outside the ambit of Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration. 
Based on the text of the interim agreements, there is a strong argument that the sole source 
of the PA's authority and legitimacy are the accords it concluded with Israel. See generally Justus 
R. Weiner, Human Rights in Limbo During The Interim Period of The Israel-Palestinian Peace Process: 
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visited Israel, meet the "return to his country" test. Finally, the Univer-
sal Declaration posits an individual right and not one that applies to 
masses of people.192 
Also proffered as authority is Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention.193 This provision forbids the permanent evacuation of areas 
occupied during international conflicts. 194 Its relevance to the Palestin-
ian refugees and displaced persons is doubtful, however, for several 
reasons. First, Article 49 presupposes an international conflict and 
therefore would have no applicability to the civil conflict between jews 
and Arabs in Palestine prior to the Declaration of Independence of 
the State of Israel on May 15, 1948.195 The regular armies of Egypt, 
Transjordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon then officially entered into Pal-
estine, 196 precipitating the international stage of the conflict. Thus, 
refugees who fled after that date as well as displaced persons from the 
1967 War may clear this hurdle. Second, this Convention focuses on 
protecting civilians during war and has virtually nothing197 to say about 
resolving post-war refugee or displaced person issues. Third, the Israel 
Supreme Court has held that the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which 
constitute conventional international law, do not automatically become 
part of the binding municipal law of Israel in the absence of a process 
of legal adoption (enactment) by the Knesset (parliament).198 Fourth 
and finally, the Fourth Geneva Convention came into force on October 
Review, Analysis & Implications, 27 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 761 (1996). The logical interpretation 
of the interim agreements is that the West Bank and Gaza remain occupied by the Israeli military 
with the PA acting as nothing more than a delegate of the Israeli occupation administration. See, 
e.g., Cairo Agreement, supra note 5, art. XXIII(7), at 637; D.O.P., supra note 4, art. IV, at 1528; 
see also Oslo II, supra note 8, arts. XI(1), XXXI(8). Among the necessary qualifications for 
statehood which the PA lacks is the capacity to enter into relations with the other states. See Oslo 
II, supra note 8, art. IX(5) (a); Cairo Agreement, supra note 5, art. VI(2) (a), at 630. On the subject 
of the legal criteria of statehood see, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 181, at 72-79. 
192 The Right of Return, supra note 136, at 114. 
193 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 183, art. 49, at 318-19. For a general argument 
favoring applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, see Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the 
Middle East Situation, 33 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB. 5 (1968). 
194 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 183, art. 49, at 318-19. Article 49 stipulates that 
persons temporarily evacuated (where the military situation so requires) be "transferred back to 
their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased." !d. 
195 See Radley, supra note 1, at 596--97. 
196 See id. at 590. 
197 But see Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 183, art. 44, at 316. 
198 H. C. 785/87, 845/87, 27/88, Mfo v. IDF Commander of Judea and Samaria, reprinted in 
THE RULING OF THE ISRAEL HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE ON THE EXPULSION OF PALESTINIAN AGITA-
TORS 36 (April 1988) (unofficial translation) (available from Israeli Ministry of Justice, Human 
Rights and International Relations Department). 
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21, 1950,199 and hence cannot be applied to the 1948 refugees, al-
though this cannot be said about the displaced persons of 1967. 
Another arguably relevant instrument is the 1966 U.N. Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which in Article 12(4) affirms, "No one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country."200 Israel, 
however, could justifY its refusal to permit repatriation under the "pub-
lic emergency" provision in Article 4. 201 Furthermore, as with the Uni-
versal Declaration, the right of return created by the U.N. Covenant is 
limited to nationals (or at most, permanent residents) and is not 
applicable to masses of displaced people.202 
B. U.N. Resolutions Endorsing Repatriation 
Palestinians frequently cite a variety of U.N. General Assembly reso-
lutions which address the subject of the Palestinian refugees and pur-
port to establish a Palestinian right of return. The most important 
resolution relating to this issue is U.N. General Assembly Resolution 
194, adopted on December 11, 1948.203 The problem with accepting 
General Assembly resolutions as an authorization for Palestinian repa-
triation is that they do not normally constitute binding authority over 
sovereign states.204 Regarding Resolution 194, for example, Professor 
Ruth Lapidoth notes that the language of the resolution does not 
recognize a clear right for the Palestinians to return, but merely "rec-
ommends that the refugees 'should' be 'permitted' to return."205 Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 194 limits permission to individuals that wish 
to return and are willing to "live at peace with their neighbors."206 In 
other words, even if one ignores the non-binding nature of General 
Assembly resolutions, Resolution 194 limits the return of Palestinian 
199 DoCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 272 (Adam Robert~ & Richard Gue1ff eds., 1982). 
20°Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 184, art. 12(4), at 54. 
201 Td. art. 4, at 53. 
202 The Right of Return, supra note 136, at 1 14. 
203 'The General Assembly resolves that the [Palestinian] refugees wishing to return to their 
homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest 
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not 
to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or 
in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible." See G.A. Res. 
194, supra note 94, para. 11, at 24. 
204BROWNLIE, supra note 181, at 14. 
20'' The Right of Return, supra note 136, at 116 (emphasis added). 
206 Td. (citing G.A. Res. 194, supra note 94, para. 11, at 24). 
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refugees to those who wish to live peaceably with Israel, i.e., by refrain-
ing from terrorism and irredentist activities. 
The question that now arises is how such persons can be, on a 
case-by-case basis, distinguished from others who reject the peace proc-
ess.207 It should not be overlooked that Resolution 194 also posits the 
option of paying "compensation" for lost or damaged property to 
refugees who do not return. Notwithstanding the particular language 
of Resolution 194, however, it illustrates the opportunistic use of par-
ticular resolutions by the Arab states and Palestinians. For example, 
every Arab state voted against Resolution 194 but decades later it 
became a cornerstone of their efforts to secure repatriation or com-
pensation for the Palestinian refugees.208 
During the years from 1952 until 1968, the General Assembly annu-
ally reaffirmed209 its Resolution 513.210 This resolution favored a solu-
tion involving public works projects as a vehicle to resettle and inte-
grate the refugees in the Arab countries where they were located.211 In 
the immediate aftermath of the 1967 War the U.N. Security Council 
adopted Resolution 237212 which stated, inter alia, that Israel should 
"facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas 
[where hostilities occurred] since the outbreak of hostilities. "213 Shortly 
thereafter it adopted Resolution 242 in which the Security Council 
"[a]ffirm[ed] further the necessity ... [f]or achieving a just settlement 
of the refugee problem."214 No means to achieve these goals were 
specified, however. 
During the ensuing years, particularly after the Arab, Moslem, Third 
World and Soviet Block states began to dominate the General Assem-
bly, numerous resolutions were adopted.215 These resolutions invariably 
207 Persons convicted of security offenses against Israel since the D.O.P. took effect would clearly 
fall into the latter category. It would be more difficult to arrive at this determination for persons 
who had been imprisoned or administratively detained during the Intifada, but who claim to now 
support the peace process. 
208 Seminar, supra note 135, at 364-65. 
209 See Radley, supra note 1, at 604. 
210 G.A. Res. 513, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1951). 
211 See id. 
212 S.C. Res. 237, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1361st mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1967). 
213 /d. 
214 S.C. Res. 242, supra note 92. 
215 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); 
G.A. Res. 2963(E), U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. 
Res. 2792(D), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 
2672(C), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 
2535(B), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969). 
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endorsed Palestinian repatriation and linked it to self-determination 
in such a manner as to raise doubts whether they were consistent with 
Israel's continued sovereign existence.216 Furthermore, the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly, Security Council, and the various U.N. agencies have 
maintained a blatantly hostile attitude toward Israel for more than two 
decades, and there is reason to question whether "political" resolutions 
should be given legal credence.217 Most Israelis and many other ob-
servers218 discount the U.N. assessments of matters involving Israel. 
Even with the repeal of the resolution equating Zionism with racism 
in 1991,219 the U.N. still has yet to demonstrate an impartial attitude 
towards Israel.220 However, even if the Palestinian "right of return" does 
not have a definite basis in international law, considering its immense 
importance to the overall dynamic of the peace process, the Palestini-
ans may be able to claim a "right" of return given both their continued 
presence in the land and as a primary way to alleviate the prolonged 
misery of the refugees and displaced persons. 
C. Developments in International Law 
The political and technical complexity of the Palestinian return issue 
has largely prevented its resolution at both the political and legal level. 
Moreover, it is questionable whether international law in its present 
state of development is competent to address this intricate matter. One 
conspicuous deficiency is that the present regime of international law 
regulating this area largely fails to consider who has international 
responsibility for rehabilitating refugees and displaced persons. On 
one hand, there seems to be an assumption that this responsibility 
216 The Right of Return, supra note 136, at 120; Radley, supra note 1, at 604. 
217 See HARRIS 0. SCHOENBF:RG, A MANDATE FOR TERROR: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PLO 
251-327 (1989). 
218 0ne observer noted that "[b]y equating Israel's temporary deportations with very perma-
nent ethnic massacres in Bosnia, or with Iraq's territorial marauding, persecution of Kurds and 
continuous military defiance of the U.N., the U.N. members and the Secretary General are 
conniving in a distortion of history, reality and morality." A.M. Rosenthal, Dances With Wolves, 
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 1993, at A27; see also Mortimer B. Zuckerman, The PLO as Image Maker, U.S. 
NEws & WoRLD REP., jan. 22, 1990, at 76. 
219 G.A. Res. 46/86, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 74th plen. mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc A/Res/46/86 
(1992) (repealing G.A. Res. 3379 (1975), determining "that zionism is a form of racism and racial 
discrimination"). 
220 Meir Rosenne, Double Standard, JERUSALEM PosT,jan. 11, 1993, at 6 (U.N. never condemns 
violence directed at Jews or Israelis); see, e.g., Marilyn Henry et al., Israel, US Reject UN Kana 
Report, JERUSALEM PosT, May 9, 1996, at 1; The UN and Its Allies, JERUSALEM PosT, May 10, 1996, 
at 4. 
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should be shouldered by the state from which the refugees fled. This 
assumption, however, seems inequitable given that, as in the Palestin-
ian situation, the reason for the Palestinian flight in 1948 can be 
attributed to the conduct of several states (not to mention a non-state 
entity, i.e., the local Palestinian leadership). Moreover, following the 
Palestinian exodus of 1948 and the subsequent displacement in 1967, 
it is possible to hold the refugees themselves, some of whom fled 
voluntarily, partially accountable for their plight. Furthermore, as the 
Palestinian situation also highlights, it is probably inequitable to re-
quire the country of origin to bear the entire burden of rehabilitating 
refugees when for decades these refugees could have been absorbed 
in the countries to which they fled were it not for local political 
objectives. 
A comparison to municipal law, however, may shed some light on 
the lacunae presented by an international legal analysis. One possible 
improvement would be the adoption in international law of a fault 
liability principle. Under this approach, the duty to rehabilitate a 
refugee population would be shared both by those states that created 
the problem in the first place and the countries who failed to mitigate 
the plight of the refugees when they had the opportunity and the 
means to do so. 
It must be noted, however, that most analogies from municipal law 
to international law are dangerous. The inherent differences between 
these regimes do not facilitate a straightforward transferral of doc-
trines. Even so, in this case, international refugee law has much to gain 
from a municipal law-based fault liability approach. Adoption of such 
a rule would not only lead to the rehabilitation of refugees but to the 
just allocation of responsibility for such rehabilitation. Moreover, a 
system that attempts to pursue an equitable apportionment of interna-
tional duties is likely to be politically feasible and thus have greater 
potential for actually solving a given refugee situation. 
In practical terms, a resolution of the plight of refugees and dis-
placed persons will only be achieved if Israel, the Palestinian leader-
ship, the neighboring Arab states and international sources of funding 
combine their efforts. The issue is too complicated and too protracted 
to be solved without extensive cooperation. This presents both a chal-
lenge and an opportunity since, as stated above, it is unlikely that the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict will reach a meaningful resolution without 
significant advances toward refugee and displaced person rehabilita-
tion. Consequently, it becomes necessary to go beyond simply analyz-
ing these issues under international law. It is worthwhile to consider 
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whether it is possible to tailor a framework for the resolution of the 
political aspects of the claims. 
III. RESOLVING CLAIMS BY AN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL 
One method221 of addressing the refugee and displaced persons 
issues would be to establish a bilateral222 or multilateraF23 claims com-
mission to arbitrate the financial claims of not only Palestinian refu-
gees and displaced persons, but also of Jewish refugees. An interesting 
analogue for such a commission was established pursuant to the inter-
national agreements that led to a settlement of the Iran hostage crisis 
on January 19, 1981.224 The Algiers Accords,225 the collective term for 
these agreements, provided, in part, for the creation of an arbitral 
forum in the Hague under the title of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal (Tribunal) .226 The Tribunal's jurisdiction included an explicit 
authorization of Article 11(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration to 
decide "claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims 
of nationals of Iran against the United States," arising "out of debts, 
contract ... expropriations or other measures affecting property rights 
"227 
221 For a discussion of various methods of approaching this problem, see generally Eyal Benvenisti 
& Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future l>raeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. 
]. INT'L L., 295, 331-35 (1995). 
222 Generally international claims involve two sovereign entities. See WILLIAM W. BISHOP JR., 
INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 742-43 (3d ed., 1971). Since the PAis not a nation 
state a conceptual hurdle would have to be overcome, although this same issue has not prevented 
the conclusion of the D.O.P. and the four interim agreements between Israel and the PLO, albeit 
with international sponsorship (i.e., the United States, the Russian Federation, the European 
Union, Norway and Egypt signed as witnesses of the Oslo II Agreement). 
223 Ideally such a tribunal would be multilateral. This is because Jewish refugees have claims 
against countries such as Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Iraq and Syria, while Palestinian refugees settled 
in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, etc. The participation of Jordan would be particularly helpful in that 
the largest number of exiled Palestinians hold Jordanian citizenship. See GAZIT, supra note 27, 
at 6. 
224 During the past 195 years international arbitration and adjudication of claims has been 
widely employed to determine state responsibility for wrongs to aliens. See BISHOP, supra note 
222, at 742-841. 
225JoHN A. WESTBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND CLAIMS INVOLVING GOVERNMENT 
PARTIES: CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 4 (1991). 
226 It must be said that, with the exception of a few tribunals established under post-World War 
II peace treaties, the Tribunal was the only tribunal to have been established in the last fifty years. 
Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 221, at 332. 
227 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Con-
cerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the 
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The circumstances of the claims brought before this Tribunal were 
in some respects comparable to those that could be brought by the 
Palestinian refugees, Palestinian displaced persons and Jewish refu-
gees. In particular, nearly the entire population of Americans living in 
Iran prior to Khomeini's rise to power fled Iran during a period of 
four months, beginning November 1, 1978 and ending February 28, 
1979, never to return.228 Their flight was apparently due not merely 
to revolutionary upheaval, but also to the anti-American posture of 
Khomeini's forces, which was manifested in the Ayatollah's pronounce-
ment that the U.S. government was the enemy of the Iranian people. 
By the end of March, 1991, American parties were awarded a sum 
total of nearly 1.8 billion U.S. dollars and Iranian parties were awarded 
approximately 600,000 U.S. dollars.229 All of these awards were paid in 
full. 230 Of the 40,000 Americans who were forced to leave Iran, only 
1500 actually filed claims at the Tribunal alleging that they had been 
"wrongfully expelled" by the Iranian Government or by revolutionary 
forces that became the Iranian government.231 These 1500 cases con-
stituted forty percent of the entire caseload of the TribunaJ.232 The 
successful use of the Tribunal as a legal framework removed from the 
political area to resolve financial claims on a case-by-case basis warrants 
consideration as a model.233 Perhaps a similar tribunal could arbitrate 
the property claims of the refugees from 1948 and the displaced 
persons of 1967. 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, art. 11(2), reprinted in 1 IRAN-U.S. 
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 9 (1983). 
228 Charles N. Brower, The Lessons of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: How May They Be 
Applied in the Case of Iraq?, 32 VIR. J. INT'L L. 421, 426 (1992) [hereinafter Lessons]. 
229 These sums refer to all the financial settlements finalized by the Tribunal, including gov-
ernment-against-government contractual-commercial claims as well as claims filed by individual 
claimants. These sums do not include any interest payable after the award. Tribunal Communique 
No. 91/4, reprinted in AIDA AVANESSIAN, IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL IN AcTION 
310-12 (1993). 
230 Lessons, supra note 228, at 422. 
231 Interestingly, the Tribunal agreed that wrongful expulsion need not arise from the applica-
tion of force or a direct governmental order, but also "constructively," a term applicable "if the 
circumstances in the residence are such that the alien cannot reasonably be regarded as having 
any real choice." See id. at 427. 
232 Other claims included government-against-government and contractual-commercial claims. 
See AvANESSIAN, supra note 229; Lessons, supra note 228, at 427. 
233 It is the author's conviction that the success ofthe proposed tribunal would not be irrelevant, 
even though its greatest viability would be in resolving commercial disputes, like the Tribunal. 
Contra Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 221, at 333. 
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During its ten years of operation, the Tribunal managed to resolve 
about ninety-five percent of all the claims submitted to it by the two 
governments and their respective nationals. 234 The success of the Tri-
bunal prompted Tribunal arbitrator Charles N. Brower to declare that, 
"the record of history . . . will judge the Tribunal to have been a 
remarkable institution that successfully met the substantial challenges 
it faced and managed both to apply and advance principles of inter-
national law in the context of international arbitration. "235 Further-
more, by agreeing to this method of dispute settlement, the release of 
the diplomatic hostages held by Iranians in the United States Embassy 
in Tehran was facilitated, over four billion dollars of loans made by 
U.S. banks to Iran were repaid, and the United States provided its 
nationals with a forum to obtain effective relief for their claims. 236 Iran, 
on the other hand, saved face on the domestic front, had a substantial 
amount of its blocked assets returned and received much needed 
funds. 237 The accomplishments of the Tribunal are underscored by the 
fact that its success was achieved in the absence of diplomatic relations 
between Iran and the United States and, in fact, against the back-
ground of marked hostility between the governments and peoples.238 
The Tribunal functioned despite language differences, a profound 
cultural conflict and dissimilar legal traditions. Moreover, although 
relations between Iran and the United States have not warmed during 
the years since the Tribunal concluded its task, 239 neither government 
has questioned the legitimacy or finality of the Tribunal's decisions. 
It is significant, however, that the population of Palestinian refugees 
and displaced persons is considerably larger than the 40,000 Ameri-
cans who fled Iran. Hence, the number of claimants would likely far 
exceed the number who filed with the Tribunal and the claims would 
be much more difficult to conclude in a timely fashion if each were 
234 Charles N. Brower, Settling Iraqi Reparations, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, M,Ypap File. 
235 Charles N. Brower & Mark D. Davis, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal After Seven Years: 
A Retrospective View From the Inside, ARB. J., Dec. 1988, at 16, 30. 
236 See AVANESSIAN, supra note 229, at 1-4. 
237 See generally id. 
238 Specific manifestations of this hostility include the sinking of the Iran Ajar in 1987 by U.S. 
military forces, the Iran-Contra Mfair, the shooting down of an Iranian airbus civilian aircraft in 
1988 by U.S. naval forces, and alleged Iranian complicity in the taking and holding of American 
hostages in Lebanon. See Lessons, supra note 228, at 421-22. 
239 Containing Iran, jERUSALEM PosT, May 2, 1995, at 6; see also GEOFFREY KEMP, FoREVER 
ENEMIES? AMERICAN POLICY & THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 75-79 (1994); Dan Oberdorfer et 
a!., Iran Paid for the Release of Hostages, WAsH. PosT, Jan. 19, 1992, at A-1. 
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examined individually.240 The U.N. faced a similar dilemma in its efforts 
to resolve the claims of the nearly one million people who, during 1990 
and 1991, became refugees as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait.241 The U.N. Security Council responded by es-
tablishing the U.N. Compensation Commission (Commission) with a 
mandate to consider "consolidated claims" by category submitted by 
governments representing individual claimants.242 Categories were to 
be based on criteria established by the Commission and awards were 
to be drawn from the U.N. Compensation Fund to be given to govern-
ments for distribution to individual claimants.243 The claims that were 
to be justiciable before the Commission include personal injury, in-
cluding "mental pain and anguish," as well as death, and "losses of 
income, support, housing or personal property, or medical expenses 
or cost of departure from Iraq or Kuwait."244 In essence, measures were 
taken to maximize the likelihood that individuals who had really suf-
fered would be able to obtain compensation once funding was secured. 
In the opinion of this author, a arbitral tribunal established to 
resolve the claims of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons as well 
as Jewish refugees from Arab countries could facilitate the timely set-
tlement of most outstanding grievances. 
Of course numerous vital preliminary issues would have to be settled 
before the proposed tribunal could begin its deliberations. For exam-
ple, its structure245 (including, of course, how the arbitrators are to be 
selected) and procedures246 should be stipulated in the terms of refer-
240 Due to the rules of procedure and evidence, it is not likely that hundreds of thousands of 
Israeli and Palestinian claims will be filed. Furthermore, although resolving claims in a timely 
fashion is desirable, the interest of peace favors careful and well-reasoned rulings. But see 
Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 221, at 333. 
241 See justus R. Weiner, lsraer1 Expulsion of l1lamic Militants to Southern Lebanon, 26 CoL. HuM. 
RTs. L. REv. 357,394 (1995). 
242 Lessons, supra note 228, at 424. 
24'1 !d. This U.N. Compensation Fund was an innovative structure, combining elements both of 
international claims commissions and national commissions. Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 221, 
at 333. 
244 Letter from the President of the Governing Council of the U.N. Compensation Commission 
to the President of the Security Council, Aug. 2, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1711, 1712 (1991). Significantly, 
the U.N. Security Council only recently approved the Iraqi sales which would furnish the Com-
pensation Commission with the necessary funds to pay claims. See Lessons, supra note 228, at 423; 
UN Ready to Implement Oiljor-Food Plan, JERUSALEM PosT, Dec. 9, 1996, at 9. This is because 70 
percent of the revenues raised by such sales would be at the disposal of Saddam Hussein's 
government, something the United States has regarded as unacceptable in light oflraq's domestic 
conduct. ld. 
24 '' If large numbers of claims, including many with complex proof problems, are anticipated 
it would be useful to set up multiple bodies to hear and adjudicate matters simultaneously. 
246 Issues to be addressed include the placement of the burden of proof (given the difficulty 
1997] RIGHT TO RETURN 49 
ence of the tribunal. The method(s) for funding the substantial sums 
necessary to operate the tribunal and to compensate successful claim-
ants will have to be worked out at the politicallevel.247 Once funds are 
available, detailed mechanisms for assessing the value of property, 
especially real property, and calculating the amount of compensation 
need to be established. Unfortunately, as has been noted, "In the 
context of refugees' property, there is too little practice to support any 
conclusion as to the lawful standard of compensation."~4H For obvious 
reasons the idea of "adequate compensation," in contrast to full com-
pensation, seems better suited to the refugee problem. Indeed, as has 
been noted, "[t]he current value of the property may be influenced 
by investments, both public and private, that may have increased or 
decreased its value .... [T] he payment of full compensation could 
drain the resources of the state and create instability during a delicate 
transitional period. "249 
In the same negotiations that set up the tribunal it would be desir-
able to reach an agreement on the numbers and permitted destina-
tion(s) of the returning Palestinians. This might be resolved by resur-
recting the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement,250 which provided that any 
returning Palestinians would be absorbed by the Palestinian entity. In 
the alternative, Israel might agree to absorb a specified number of 
displaced Palestinians, provided they do not present a security threat, 
on the condition that all others are settled and naturalized in the Arab 
states where they reside or in the PA-governed areas if it becomes a 
sovereign entity. Whatever arrangement is negotiated, Israel should 
insist on the PA and PLO leadership publicly renouncing their claim 
to a "right of return" and agreeing that the amounts awarded by the 
of accessing records from 30 or 50 years ago, the placement of the burden may dictate the 
outcome of most claims), the survivability of claims, how the tribunal will function if certain states 
refuse to cooperate and whether losses due to acts of war (or of a mob) are compensable. 
~47 Lump sum settlement of claims has become increasingly prevalent since World War II. 
BISHOP, supra note 222, at 743. This led Richard Lillich and Burns Weston to the conclusion that 
"in the last forty years this procedural device has become, without doubt, the paramount vehicle 
for settling international claims." Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 221, at 334. 
24H Id. at 330. For example, disagreements over the actual appraisal of property, as well as 
political difficulties, frustrated the implementation of the compensation system between India 
and Pakistan in 1949. ld. 
~49 ld. at 331. For these authors, the principle of "adequate compensation" is analogous to the 
notion of equitable compensation, calling for an ad hoc appraisal of the various interest~ and 
constraints involved. ld. 
250 See supra text accompanying notes 59-63. Interestingly, a recent public opinion poll among 
Hebrew-speaking Israelis indicated that approximately twice as many people favor as oppose the 
Beilin-Abu Mazen understanding. See Liat Collins, Poll: Majority Favors Beilin-Abbas Plan, JERU-
SALEM PosT, Dec. 10, 1996, at 2. 
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arbitral tribunal constitute a full and final settlement of all financial 
claims. 
It is recommended that such a tribunal be guided, inter alia, by the 
need to attribute responsibility for compensation on the party or par-
ties at fault. 251 The application of a fault liability principle to claims 
brought before the tribunal would take into account not only the cause 
of the flight of a given refugee but also the reasons that the refugee 
was not rehabilitated subsequently. Thus, it is conceivable, in ideal 
terms, that a given Palestinian refugee would be compensated with 
funds from a variety of sources including Israel and the Arab states. 
While tribunal adjudication on a case-by-case basis would guarantee 
the most equitable resolution of the return issue, the sheer number of 
claims and the contemporary political environment suggest that such 
a structure may be, at present, politically unrealistic. It is unlikely that 
Arab states or the PA would agree to the establishment of a tribunal 
that would assign to them even part of the blame for creating or 
neglecting the Palestinian refugee and displaced persons problems. 
Moreover, the Arab states have, thus far, shown no willingness to admit 
historical responsibility for, or consider compensating, their Jewish 
refugees. In practical terms, it may only be possible for the tribunal to 
initially discuss Palestinian claims and Israeli responsibility, and not 
deal directly with the duties of Arab states or Jewish refugee claims. 
However, the tribunal may be able to implicitly place the onus for 
compensating and rehabilitating some refugees on Arab states merely 
by rejecting their claims against Israel. 
As far as the number of Palestinian claims is concerned, in practice 
these would likely only be brought by persons residing in countries 
that have diplomatic relations with Israel. Relatively affluent, educated 
individuals with some evidentiary basis, i.e. title registered in the land 
registry office, would be more likely to bring claims than others. It 
might be, therefore, that the number of actual claims would not be as 
great as some might fear. 252 For those Palestinians unable to submit 
specific claims, the tribunal would perhaps fund efforts in their coun-
tries of residence to improve their living standards. In the alternative 
251 This differs from the so-called lump sum agreements, where the paying state usually does 
not admit responsibility. Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 221, at 334. 
252 Due to the rules of procedure and evidence, it is not likely that hundreds of thousands of 
Israeli and Palestinian claims will be filed. Furthermore, although resolving claims in a timely 
fashion is desirable, the interest of peace favors careful and well-reasoned rulings. But see id. at 
333. 
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a set per capita or per family unit amount253 could be offered without 
requiring any proof of individual property loss or suffering. 
In agreeing to a set per capita or per family unit amount, the PA 
would face both advantages and disadvantages. The former would 
include the PA's physical proximity to the Palestinian refugees and 
displaced persons living in the West Bank and Gaza, and the likelihood 
that its role in distributing funds would engender additional political 
support. The drawbacks would include the likelihood that corruption 
or nepotism, characteristic of the PA's administration, would taint the 
operation and that Arafat's strained relations with the leaders of Syria, 
Libya, Lebanon or Kuwait would prevent large numbers of claimants 
from applying for or receiving the sums due to them. Indeed, "[t]he 
present political situation in the Middle East does not hold much 
promise that the concerned Arab governments will agree to entrust a 
Palestinian authority with administering funds to the Palestinian refu-
gees situated in their respective territories."254 Clearly the very exist-
ence of a tribunal, even one that cannot provide any compensation for 
many of the refugees and displaced persons, would enable this conten-
tious issue to be removed from the final status talks agenda and thereby 
clear the way for the advancement of the peace process. 
It must be stressed that even if the tribunal cannot provide any 
compensation for many of the refugees and displaced persons, it would 
represent a milestone. Putting the issue of refugee property claims into 
historical perspective, the Tribunal was revolutionary. Previously, "in 
no case of massive relocation ... have the refugees regained the prop-
erty they left behind. "255 Germans transferred from Eastern Europe lost 
title to the property that they left behind; the Czech government 
rejected the claim to compensation for Sudeten German property; 
after the mass relocation of millions oflndians and Pakistanis in 194 7, 
their abandoned immovable property was seized by the governments; 
and in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion in 1974, the right to 
property remains a major obstacle to reconciliation between the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriot refugees. 256 
It should be noted that even if such a tribunal is not established, 
negotiation regarding the return issue should be guided by the sug-
253 Another option is that claims could be considered on a group rather than an individual 
basis, divided, for example, according to locale. 
254 !d. at 339. 
255 !d. at 324. 
256 !d. at 322-24. 
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gested fault liability principle. In other words, it may be possible for 
Israel, as a preliminary measure, to compensate and permit the return 
(to the PA) of those refugees and displaced persons for which it accepts 
primary responsibility. In return, the Arab states and the PA could 
agree to negotiate at a later date their responsibilities for Palestinian 
rehabilitation and for Jewish refugee claims.257 In this way, the refugee 
issue could be seen as moving toward resolution, while Israel would 
earn international recognition for the principles of multilateral re-
sponsibility for the resolution of these problems. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the divergent positions taken by the parties regarding the 
refugee issue since the inception of the State of Israel, settlement of 
the return issue in the context of the permanent status negotiations 
would be a remarkable achievement. Selective references to the history 
of the refugee and displaced persons problems will no doubt persist as 
the sides pursue political and moral leverage in the final status nego-
tiations. Yet, the fate of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons is 
a fundamental concern for all parties involved in the peace process, 
and not merely for its obvious humanitarian dimension. Indeed, the 
return issue is perhaps the most sensitive and contentious issue on the 
table in the final status negotiations. Many of these issues do not 
demand, nor can they await, a comprehensive and final settlement to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict before they are addressed. Water, environ-
ment, regional economic development, arms control and regional 
security and refugees are precisely the five tracks of the multilateral 
negotiations of the Middle East peace process. 258 Likewise, the losses 
incurred by the Jewish refugees from Arab countries deserve to be 
257 Even Palestinian-American Professor Rashid Khalidi states "if compensation for property lost 
is the basis for part of these reparations ... then Jews who left or were forced to leave Arab 
countries in and after 1948 similarly have a perfectly legitimate claim, one which might conceiv-
ably be resolved in tandem with reparations to the Palestinians." Rashid Khalidi, Toward a 
Solution, in PALESTINIAN REFUGEES: THEIR PROBLEM AND FUTURE 23, 24 (Ctr. for Pol'y Analysis 
on Palestine ed., 1994) (adapted from Khalidi's comments at the Georgetown Center for Con-
temporary Arab Studies' symposium, Palestinian Refugees: Their Problem and Future, Oct. 6, 1994). 
258 Also in the multilateral talks, the refugee issue "is at the core of the conflict and is the most 
politically-and emotionally-laden question of the multilaterals." Bryn en & Tansley, supra note 
12, at 55. Indeed, in the working group on refugees of the multilateral negotiations, the Pales-
tinians saw the group as a forum for addressing the substantive concerns and the political rights 
of the refugees. Israel, on the other hand, regarded the discussion of the humanitarian aspects 
and the improvement in the welfare of the refugees solely as a confidence-building measure and 
not as a substantive issue. PETERS, supra note 12, at 15. Finally, the meager level of activities and 
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addressed. Failure to resolve these claims may jeopardize the entire 
peace process. Moreover, the outcome of this controversy will intersect 
a wide range of other matters such as water needs, election results, 
land usage, city planning, job creation, budgets, ecological impact, 
political stability, and, of course, security. 259 
The Palestinian refugee and displaced persons issue began as one 
of providing relief in the wake of wars. Instead of being solved by 
compensation for property losses, resettlement in one or more of the 
Arab states, partial repatriation to Israel, or some combination of these 
methods, the problem was cultivated and enhanced for political rea-
sons. Driven by the desire to "liberate their homeland," the immediate 
needs and realistic options of the Palestinian refugees and displaced 
persons were ignored during the decades that preceded the D.O.P. 
Whatever the causes for their departure, once across the frontier they 
became pawns in the zero-sum game of Israeli-Palestinian politics. 
While it is impossible to satisfy the pecuniary and political aspira-
tions of every claimant, this author believes their claims can be resolved 
as an international issue. That is to say that the claims can be removed 
from the long and contentious agenda of the final status peace nego-
tiations by setting up a claims tribunal. 260 To be successful such a entity 
will have to be adequately funded and have clear terms of reference 
regarding the destination(s) of returning individuals. Clearly it is in 
the interest of Israel, the Palestinian leadership and the world commu-
nity to make an effort to close this unhappy chapter of the Arab-Israel 
conflict. A carefully structured arbitral claims tribunal offers the great-
est hope for achieving this aim and thereby would contribute to the 
overall objective of a comprehensive peace. 
the duplication of efforts raise serious questions about the continuing value of maintaining a 
separate and distinct working group on refugees. !d. at 18. 
259 See id. at 3. 
260 This, by itself, furnishes the parties a substantial incentive to set up a tribunal. 
